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Introduction 
 
A Small Settlement from a Big Legacy  
Nestled within the rocky landscape behind a small, unassuming, sandy beach on the 
Bahamian island of Abaco sits a rectangular memorial plaque.  In 1983, Dr. Steve Dodge, a 
history professor and nautical 
researcher, commissioned its 
creation and placement to 
commemorate the bicentennial 
of the attempted loyalist 
settlement on that island in 
1783.  The plaque conveys the 
area’s name as “Carleton 
Point” in honor of Sir Guy 
Carleton, the British 
Commander-in-Chief during 
the British evacuation at the 
conclusion of the American 
War for Independence.  On the 
land behind that point, a group 
of loyalist refugees had come 
to settle the island, hoping it 
would become the “hub of a 
Map 1: Carleton Point commemorated at the Bicentennial Ceremony in 
1983. From Steve Dodge, Abaco: The History of an Out Island and its 
Cays (Florida: White Sound Press, 2005).	
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new prosperous British Empire in Abaco.”1  As loyal British subjects, these settlers fled the 
newly independent United States where they were unsafe and unwelcome, leaving behind most 
of their property and possessions in search of a safe place to live.  Along with the point of land 
upon which they landed, they called their settlement Carleton and the adjacent creek Carleton 
Creek.  As Commander-in-Chief at the end of a long war, Sir Guy Carleton had overseen their 
safe evacuation out of the United States to another part of the empire.  
The loyalist settlement of Carleton was not successful, as the settlers struggled to grow 
enough food to sustain their colony and commerce languished.  The rocky terrain of the island 
made it nearly impossible to grow crops.2  Because they had expected to transplant the 
commerce of New York, Boston, Virginia, and other prosperous previously British economic 
centers to the islands, they constructed ships for trade, but were unable, however, to fill them 
with crops and other goods.  In October of 1783, John Harding, the British official that 
accompanied the settlers, wrote to Sir Guy Carleton himself asking for “Six Months Provisions,” 
shoes, some nails, and medicine, “as the People are Landed very sickly from the Ships.”3  Within 
a few months, two-thirds of the settlers abandoned Carleton and founded other towns nearby, 
such as Marsh Harbor, in the hopes of better success.4  After experiencing chaos and uncertainty 
from the American War and fleeing the mainland, as well as a long journey to the island, the 
hardships at Abaco must have been arduous to bear.  In a few years time, the settlement at 
Carleton ceased to exist.  
																																																								
1 Steve Dodge, Abaco: The History of an Out Island and its Cays (Florida: White Sound Press, 2005); email 
2 Sandra Riley, Homeward Bound: A Story of the Bahama Islands to 1850 with a Definitive Study of Abaco in the 
American Loyalist Plantation Period (Miami, FL: Island Research, 1983), 143.  
3 John Harding to Guy Carleton, October 1, 1783, British Headquarters Papers #9266 in Riley, Homeward Bound, 
143-4.  
4 Dodge, Abaco: The History of an Out Island; email correspondence with Dr. Dodge.   
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Although the Carleton settlement did not come to fruition, its history and the 1983 
commemoration speaks to the legacy of Sir Guy Carleton as one of the dozens of places where 
loyalists fled in the wake of the American Revolution.  Carleton’s legacy of aiding loyalists is 
most strongly connected to the black loyalist population—out of the 127 refugees on the first 
ship from New York City to Abaco, 66 of them were black men and women.5  During the course 
of the Anglo-American conflict, thousands of enslaved peoples had fled their masters, many of 
whom took refuge with the British.  While in charge of protecting the loyalist population 
gathered in New York City, Carleton interpreted the Treaty of Paris in a way that allowed him to 
uphold British law that protected its subjects, regardless of their race.  The settlers at Abaco 
named their town after the man to whom they likely felt especially grateful, and Carleton’s 
legacy exists in other places that bear his name, such as the island called Carleton’s Prize in the 
middle of Lake Champlain.  More importantly, however, is his legacy that lived on through the 
men and women who fled to other parts of the British Empire due to his command. 
 
Historiography  
Sir Guy Carleton’s name shows up in a multitude of works within the fields of the 
eighteenth-century British Empire, the American Revolution, Canadian history, African and 
African American diaspora history, Native American history, and military history.  There are 
only four comprehensive biographies, however, on Carleton’s life.6  Two of them predominately 
focus on his defense of Quebec in 1775-76: William Charles Henry Wood’s The Father of 
																																																								
5 Riley, Homeward Bound, 142.  
6 Arthur Granville Bradley, Sir Guy Carleton (Lord Dorchester), (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966). It 
was originally published in 1907; William Charles Henry Wood, The Father of British Canada: A Chronicle of 
Carleton (Toronto: Glasgow, Brook & Company, 1920); Paul R. Reynolds, Guy Carleton, A Biography (New York: 
William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1980); Paul David Nelson, General Sir Guy Carleton, Lord Dorchester 
(London: Associated University Press, 2000). 
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British Canada, the twelfth volume of “The Chronicles of Canada,” and Paul R. Reynolds’ Guy 
Carleton, A Biography. 
While Canadian historians know him as the “Father of British Canada” thanks to Wood’s 
narrative, Carleton’s most prevalent legacy among American, British, and British Imperial 
historians was his facilitation of evacuating loyalist ex-slaves out of New York City and to safe 
parts of the empire, contrary to the intentions of the 1783 Treaty of Paris.7  The Treaty of Paris 
decisively ended the war between the British Empire and thirteen of its North American colonies 
along the eastern seaboard from Georgia to New Hampshire.  Signed by representatives from 
Britain and the rebel colonies in 1783, the treaty recognized the thirteen colonies’ independence 
from the British Empire.  Most historians who discuss Carleton do so only briefly and 
superficially, usually choosing only to outline his actions in regards to evacuating thousands of 
black loyalists out of New York City at the end of the American Revolution.8  Other historians, 
such as Ellen Wilson, Allen Gilbert, and Simon Schama, devote more attention to Carleton, but 
they focus only on his actions in the 1780s.  Although Carleton is a common figure in many 
fields of historical scholarship, historians have not made connections between his earlier life 
experiences and his actions regarding British subjects at the conclusion of the American War for 
Independence.  The actions he took over the course of his life in the British military and as a 
public official are essential in understanding his actions in 1782 and 1783.  Simply put, one 
cannot understand Carleton the Commander-in-Chief without understanding him as a person.   																																																								
7 Wood, The Father of British Canada; Mark R. Anderson, The Battle for the Fourteenth Colony: Americas War for 
Liberation in Canada, 1774-1776, (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2013). Anderson focuses on 
Carleton’s time as governor of Quebec and his overall role in Canada.  
8 Cassandra Pybus, Epic Journeys of Freedom: Runaway Slaves of the American Revolution and the Global Quest 
for Liberty (Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 2006); Maya Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the 
Revolutionary World (New York: Alfred A. Knope, 2011); Douglas R. Egerton, Death or Liberty: African 
Americans and Revolutionary America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Henry Weincek, An Imperfect 
God: George Washington, His Slaves, and the Creation of America (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2003); 
Jim Piecuch, Three Peoples, One King: Loyalists, Indians, and Slaves in the Revolutionary South, 1775-1782 
(Columbia, South Carolina: The University of South Carolina Press, 2008). 
	 6 
Ellen Wilson’s The Loyal Blacks is one of the first histories of black loyalists during the 
American Revolution and still holds great merit.  She emphasizes that Carleton “acted off his 
own bat, for he had received no instructions from home,” but offers a simplistic explanation of 
Carleton’s reasons for evacuating the black refugees: he wanted to uphold honor.9  Whether she 
meant his honor, that of the empire, or both, is unclear.  Wilson leaves unanswered where his 
strong sense of honor came from, why he felt it, and to whom or to what specifically he felt he 
owed it.10  
In Black Patriots and Loyalists, Alan Gilbert extensively discusses Carleton’s connection 
to black loyalists within British areas of control.  Like Wilson, Gilbert argues that Carleton and 
other British officials wanted to protect the black men and women behind their lines in order to 
show them the honor they were promised and deserved.  Gilbert attests to Carleton’s brilliant 
“stratagem” in defending his interpretation of the Treaty of Paris by focusing on the only ten 
records that exist of black men and women who had to go to trial for their freedom.11  These ten, 
according to Gilbert, acted as a cover for thousands who fled without a court process.12  Gilbert’s 
work paints Carleton as fervently defiant of any ideas of leaving black British subjects in the ex-
colonies, but like Wilson, does not explain why.  
Simon Schama describes Carleton through the lens of his inherited legacy of ensuring a 
British America.  Painting Carleton as an “incurable romantic” for the British Empire, Schama 
argues that his life’s mission was to safeguard British stakes and imperial influence in America.13  
Carleton inherited this mission, Schama suggests, from his friend and role model James Wolfe 
																																																								
9 Ellen Gibson Wilson, The Loyal Blacks (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1976), 55.  
10 Wilson, The Loyal Blacks, 55. 
11 Gilbert, Black Patriots and Loyalists, 191.  
12 Gilbert, Black Patriots and Loyalists, 191. 
13 Simon Schama, Rough Crossings: Britain, the Slaves and the American Revolution (London: BBC Books, 2005), 
130.  
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during the Seven Years’ War, whom Carleton saw “die a hero’s death so that British America 
might live.”14  After the disappointing defeat in the American War, Schama believes Carleton 
defended black refugees against the demands of General Washington and other Americans in 
order to vindicate “his woeful, defeated kingdom… and rescue [it] from the sordid debacle a 
shred of decency and honour.”15  Schama’s opinions about Carleton’s attachment to the empire 
are romantic and obscure more than they illuminate about Carleton’s decision-making.  In fact, 
Carleton’s life before the 1780s shaped his specific view of empire, subjects, and his end-of-war 
decisions.  
 
A New Perspective  
This thesis implements original research on the course of Carleton’s life to examine how 
his personal background as a loyal British subject, army officer, and royal governor, as well as 
contemporary ideological movements influenced his actions to protect ex-enslaved subjects in 
1783.  Because Carleton requested that his private papers be burned upon his death, this paper 
uses primary documents from official government correspondence written to and from Carleton, 
as well as contemporary correspondence, treatises, and other works.  This analysis frames 
Carleton’s evacuation of ex-slaves within the context of his life, not as a sudden act of humanity 
or desperate patriotism.  His ideological roots and personal experiences that informed his 
decision reveal that his actions were neither a passive continuity of previous British generals’ 
wartime policies, nor out of a vague sense of horror or anger at Britain’s defeat.   
Throughout the course of his life, Carleton made decisions and took actions to smoothly 
bring new subjects into the empire because he believed that imperial control and the king’s 																																																								
14 Schama, Rough Crossings, 130.  
15 Schama, Rough Crossings, 146.  
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protection was in everyone’s best interest.  Also essential to the growing empire were content 
and loyal subjects.  The era’s tendency of ethnocentricity coincided with the reality of an 
increasingly heterogeneous empire, and Carleton’s professionalizing approach to his 
responsibilities in both the military and public office affirmed Britain’s increasingly legally 
extensive notions of subjecthood in the late eighteenth century.  Although notions of subjecthood 
were expanding, the empire was still exclusionary, meaning that not all subjects received the 
same rights.16  This paper examines Carleton’s life as a dedicated servant of the British Empire 
and explores his repeated efforts to incorporate new subjects, such as French Canadians, 
members of Indian nations, and black ex-slaves, into the imperial system.  Ultimately, this thesis 
analyzes key decisions in his life that were all connected by his mental framework of an 
expansive subjecthood, as well as the context of the time, in order to determine why he decided 
to evacuate thousands of formerly enslaved black loyalists at the end of the American 
Revolution.  It additionally suggests that he believed he did not violate the peace treaty.  Indeed, 
Carleton wanted to maintain British national honor, but it is important to highlight that his 
upbringing and lifelong influence of the imperial system led him to uphold both lofty ideas of 
honor and on-the-ground promises of freedom.  He felt a duty to all British subjects, and from 
his perspective, black runaways were another group of His Majesty’s loyal subjects that deserved 
protection.  Carleton believed applying the law to all loyal British subjects, of whatever race or 
ethnicity, would ensure a prosperous empire.  
 
 
 																																																								
16 Jack P. Greene, “Introduction: Empire and Liberty” in Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty Overseas, 1600-
1900, ed. Jack P. Greene (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1-24. 
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Chapter 1: Carleton in an Emerging Empire, 1740s-1760s 
Introduction 
Sir Guy Carleton met James Wolfe, three years his junior, shortly after entering the British 
military.  Carleton entered the system as an ensign at the age of seventeen, while Wolfe was born 
into a military family, received an elite education, and enlisted as a second lieutenant in his 
father’s regiment in 1741 when he was fourteen years old.17  The friendship between Carleton 
and Wolfe began as early as 1747, when Wolfe first mentioned Carleton in a letter to a lady 
friend.18  Unlike Carleton, Wolfe spent most of the years of the War of Austrian Succession 
fighting in various campaigns.  At the war’s conclusion, Wolfe held the rank of major of the 20th 
Regiment of Foot, while Carleton was still a lieutenant.19   
Carleton likely felt discouraged by the progress of his friend in comparison to his own 
and may even have perceived the inherent inequalities of the system that supplied the best 
experiences to subjects with money and influential connections.  Unbeknownst to him, however, 
he too was a privileged subject that would be able to use the systems set in place to experience 
success in the British Empire.  Carleton’s efforts to advance his military career and his 
experiences in both the War of Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War reflect the 
principles of patronage that dominated the British military, as well as exposed him to the 
changing nature of Britain during the mid-eighteenth century.  He served in the military during a 
period of increasing regulation and emerging professionalization, which happened alongside 
Britain’s transformation to empire.  The growth of Britain’s empire catalyzed changing notions 
of subjecthood from the 1740s to 1760s, during which Carleton himself worked to allow 																																																								
17 Ira D. Gruber, Books and the British Army in the Age of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2010), 131.  
18 Nelson, General Sir Guy Carleton, 18.  
19 Gruber, Books and the British Army, 132.  
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flexibility and accommodation for the inclusion of new subjects—he saw this as the best way to 
ensure a functional and prosperous empire.  Although Britain was marked by ethnocentrism, 
Carleton’s background in the increasingly professional military, as well as the emerging 
literature focused on human development, liberty, and empathy led him to make decisions that 
reflected ideas of extensive subjecthood. 
 
Patronage  
Guy Carleton (Sir Guy after 1776 and Lord Dorchester after 1786) was born into a land-owning 
family in Strabane, Ireland in 1724.  Although his ancestors could trace themselves back to the 
Conquest of 1066, his parents owned only a modest amount of land by Irish standards.  They 
could provide for their eleven children, but were not members of the aristocratic class.  Fitting 
the family’s modest social and economic status, Carleton received a rudimentary childhood 
education.20  When he was fourteen years old, his father died, and a year later his mother 
remarried the Reverend Thomas Skelton, who became young Carleton’s first patron. Skelton was 
well educated and took it upon himself to continue the Carleton boys’ basic education.  The 
details of the knowledge that Skelton passed onto Carleton are unknown, but it is likely that his 
teachings included religious instruction.21  
Carleton did not follow his stepfather in joining the Anglican ministry, nor is there 
evidence that he held strong religious conviction.  Instead, he followed the careers of his male 
ancestors since the reign of Charles I and entered the British army.22  Carleton and two of his 
brothers joined the army through the patronage of the Right Honorable William Conolly, a 
																																																								
20 Nelson, General Sir Guy Carleton, 17. 
21 Nelson, General Sir Guy Carleton, 18. 
22 Nelson, General Sir Guy Carleton, 17-18.  
	 11 
member of the Irish Parliament and landed-gentry, as well as a friend of their late father.23  It was 
1742 and Carleton was seventeen.   
In eighteenth-century Britain, young men wishing to enter the military system needed 
three things to align in their favor: one, there needed to be a vacancy within a regiment due to the 
death of a member or sale of their commission; two, they required the sponsorship of an 
influential patron; and three, they needed money in order to purchase the commission.  The 
patron would use their place in politics and society to vouch for the abilities and character of 
their client, and they might even help with the funding required to purchase the commission.  
Apart from supplying funding, a patron could function on a more basic level as a sort of mentor 
or teacher, such as Reverend Skelton was for Carleton.  The military was a desirable route for 
young, motivated men because “it provided an entry into circles of power and patronage centered 
on the government and court.”24  Nonetheless, in the eighteenth-century British army, officers 
were often already from the landed, well-connected class with family names to live up to.25  
Within these spheres of power, young military personnel needed to demonstrate merit, but also 
attain further patronage in order to rise in the ranks.  
When Carleton’s regiment, the 25th Regiment of Foot, joined other British forces fighting 
in the War of Austrian Succession, he was still a young lieutenant eager to advance his career.26  
His regiment, however, did not see action until 1747, seven years into the war and only a year 
before hostilities would stop.  At this point in time, Carleton became an aide-de-camp to Prince 
William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland and the king’s third son.  Despite serving the King’s 																																																								
23 Nelson, General Sir Guy Carleton, 18.  
24 Erich Weidenhammer, “Patronage and Enlightened Medicine in the Eighteenth-century British Military: The Rise 
and Fall of Dr John Pringle, 1707-1782,” Social History of Medicine 29 (2016), 21-43.  
25 Ian Roy, “The Profession of Arms,” in The Professions in Early Modern England, ed. Wilfrid Prest (Kent: Croom 
Helm Ltd, 1987), 181-219.   
26 Nelson, General Sir Guy Carleton, 18. The War of Austrian Succession lasted from December 1740 to October 
1748 and included many of the European powers over the question of Maria Theresa’s succession of the Habsburg 
throne.  
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son, Carleton was not promoted to a more prestigious regiment until 1751.  Although promoted 
to the First Foot Guards, Carleton was still a lieutenant while many of his peers, such as Wolfe, 
had risen to higher ranks.27  The differences of military rank between Sir Guy Carleton and 
Wolfe at the end of the War of Austrian Succession reveals the importance of status at birth and 
luck in the eighteenth-century British military.  From an early age, Carleton experienced the 
hierarchical nature of the British system, but would use its laws and structures to advance his 
place in society.  
 
Professionalism  
Britain’s participation in the bloody wars of eighteenth-century Europe and its colonies helped 
spur the professionalization of soldiers and sailors.28  The nature of these imperial wars created 
the need for full-time officers, typically junior officers, in order to implement a growing presence 
and control in newly acquired colonial territories.29  Historian D.J.B. Trim delineates seven 
characteristics of the early modern European profession of arms: “a discrete occupational 
identity; formal hierarchy; performance; a formal pay system; a distinct expertise and means of 
education therein; efficiency in execution of expertise; and a distinctive self-
conceptualization.”30  Carleton would have experienced all seven of Trim’s military 
characteristics in the mid-eighteenth century.  His lifelong dedication to the military, fighting in 
wars on both European and North American soil, reflected the crystallization of his sense of 
professional identity in the eighteenth century.   
One of these changes that emerged within the self-conceptualization of professional 																																																								
27 Nelson, General Sir Guy Carleton, 19.  
28 Roy, “The Profession of Arms,” 181-219. 
29 Roy, “The Profession of Arms,” 181-219.  
30 D.J.B Trim, “Introduction,” in The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism, ed. D.J.B 
Trim (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 1-35.  
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soldiers in the eighteenth century was their dependency on the Crown.  In previous centuries, 
martial aristocrats derived their honor from their autonomy and freedom of action, including 
freedom from constraint by the monarchy.  By Carleton’s era, status as a military officer had 
come to imply a strict ‘service’-oriented relationship to the Crown.  Thus, when Carleton entered 
the military as a young man, he altered his status from a civilian British subject to that of a 
servant of the king and of the empire as a whole.  Not only was Carleton bound to follow the 
authority of the laws passed by Parliament and rulings of the courts like all subjects, but he was 
also obliged to defend the country, its interests in Europe, and its growing empire.31 
An Anglican clergyman named Thomas Gisborne argued that the professional naval and 
military man should be a protector of the Crown, a life-long learner both on the battlefield and 
through military theory education, and a servant of the public good.  In 1797, he synthesized the 
responsibilities of public figures within the British national and imperial system in An Enquiry 
into the Duties of Men in the Higher and Middle Classes of Society.32  While Gisborne published 
this popular work in 1797, it was likely a compilation of ideas that had been shaped and 
practiced throughout the course of the eighteenth century.  Gisborne only had experience in the 
clergy, but he claimed to have consulted men in other professions in order to accurately convey 
various roles and standards.33  It was necessary for an eighteenth-century British officer to 
recognize his reliance on and his representation of the Crown in order to perform his duties with 
success and honor. 
Carleton exhibited his sense of connection to the Crown and a heightened sense of 
																																																								
31 See discussion in Wayne E. Lee, Barbarians and Brothers: Anglo-American Warfare, 1500-1865, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, Inc., 2011), 76-80. 
32 Gareth Atkins, “Religion, politics, and patronage in the late Hanoverian navy, c.1780 - c.1820,” Historical 
Research 88 (May 2015), 272-290. 
33 Thomas Gisborne, An enquiry into the duties of men in the higher and middle classes of society in Great Britain: 
resulting from their perspective stations, professions, and employments, (London: B. and J. White, 1797), vi.  
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military ethics during the siege of Quebec in the Seven Years’ War.34  In the summer of 1759, 
Wolfe, Carleton’s old friend, had assigned him to capture a French supply depot at Pointe-aux-
Trembles that allegedly held papers detailing French battle plans.35  The raid turned out to be 
fruitless, with Carleton and his comrades finding neither a cache of supplies nor the papers.  Near 
the shore at Pointe-aux-Trembles was a group of makeshift houses and tents inhabited by French 
Canadians who had evacuated Quebec during the siege.36  Carleton saw that there were men, 
women, and children without food and supplies living in the sketchy accommodations.  
Carleton’s six hundred soldiers were tired and lacked enthusiasm after the unrewarding raid, but 
he ordered them to ferry the starving people to the British camp at Lévis.37  At the camp, 
Carleton and his men fed and supplied their French Canadian guests.  Wolfe applauded 
Carleton’s noble action, one that perfectly accorded with emergent norms of ethical conduct 
toward non-combatants.38  Carleton’s actions not only made himself, but the Empire as a whole, 
look good.  This deed revealed his sense of morality towards people in need, as well as his 
heightened understanding that his actions should benefit the overall good of the Empire.  It 
would turn out, then unbeknownst to Carleton, that these foreigners would be considered 
subjects of the British Empire by 1763.  
Another aspect of the increasing sense of professionalism in the British military was the 
importance of a corps of officers who were “students of warfare.”39  Samuel Bever coined this 
																																																								
34 The war lasted from 1756 to 1763 and was fought on many continents. It included the powerhouses of Europe that 
formed two enemy coalitions led by Britain and France. On the North American front, it was more commonly 
known as the French and Indian War, and conflict on that front began in 1754. 
35 Reynolds, Guy Carleton, A Biography, 5.  
36 The French Canadians were also known as Québécois, but I will typically use the term French Canadian in this 
paper.  
37 Reynolds, Guy Carleton, A Biography, 5-6.  
38 Reynolds, Guy Carleton, A Biography, 6. For discussion on contemporary codes regarding non-combatants, see 
Lee Barbarians and Brothers and Barbara Donagan, “Codes and Conduct in the English Civil War,” Past & Present 
118 (1988), 65-95. 
39 Samuel Bever, The Cadet: A Military Treatise,  (London: W. Johnston in St. Paul’s Church-yard, 1756), 17. 
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term in his book written for officers, The Cadet, in 1756.  Bever’s phrase embodied the 
increasing necessity that British officer corps be well studied in military history, the art of war, 
engineering and artillery, and foreign languages.40  Bever also emphasized that officers should 
“esteem it as a Point of Honour to observe exactly the Military Laws and Articles of War,” or the 
proper customs for conducting warfare.41  As an officer striving to move up in the ranks of the 
army, Carleton would have been familiar with all of the topics that Bever highlights.  Among 
both ancient and contemporary military works, Bever’s work was a part of the emerging canon 
of literature that eighteenth-century officers were expected to study.  
Many British officers received an education at a university, college, or military academy 
and had prior knowledge of foreign language, mathematics, and drawing; but by the close of the 
War of Austrian Succession, the British realized that their officers needed to have a background 
in the military procedures and tactics of the mainland.42  The War of Austrian Succession 
revealed the British army’s need for tactics already being used by continental European armies.  
In order to keep up with the rapidly improving enemy forces, British officers turned to the works 
of continental thinkers by the 1750s.43  Carleton was present at multiple unsuccessful British 
campaigns in the Austrian War of Succession.  He also spent time around some of the highest-
ranking officers as the aide-de-camp of Prince William Augustus, King George II’s son.44  It is 
possible that Carleton heard discussion about the need for British armed forces to evolve to fit 
the newest theories and methods of war.  The British army’s compulsion to adapt continental 
wartime tactics and strategies fueled the study of both classic and contemporary military 
literature, overall bolstering the establishment of the profession of the arms. 																																																								
40 Gruber, Books and the British Army, 25.  
41 Bever, The Cadet, 150. See further discussion on the laws of war in Chapter 3.  
42 Gruber, Books and the British Army, 19.  
43 Gruber, Books and the British Army, 14.  
44 Nelson, Sir Guy Carleton, 19. 
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While neither educated at a university nor trained in an academy, Carleton’s status as a 
“student of warfare” was solidified by an unfortunate event: the death of his friend and 
benefactor James Wolfe.  On the North American front of the Seven Years’ War, Wolfe held the 
rank of Brigadier General and requested that Carleton be of service for the planned siege of 
Louisbourg, thereby becoming Carleton’s patron.  Unfortunately, Carleton’s loyal friend was 
killed leading a bayonet charge in the Battle of Quebec, also called the Battle of the Plains of 
Abraham, in September of 1759.45  Before the battle, Wolfe had written in his will to leave one 
thousand pounds and “all [his] books and papers, both here and in England” to Carleton.46  
Wolfe would not have entrusted his large collection of books and papers to someone who would 
not have appreciated them.  Wolfe’s bequest suggests that Carleton was working towards 
becoming a well-studied military man that met the new standards of professionalism.   
Although there is no catalog of Wolfe’s library, it is possible to get a glimpse of what he 
owned and passed down to Carleton by gleaning letters he wrote to friends recommending 
specific books and subject matters.  While it was normal for eighteenth-century probate records 
to include itemized lists of the deceased’s possessions, Carleton’s does not.47  Neither is 
Carleton’s last will and testament helpful regarding any specific items he possessed at the time of 
his death.  Wolfe owned, however, and presumably passed down to Carleton, works by some of 
the most popular authors of the time that officers were reading to learn about conducting war: 
Julius Caesar, Flavinus Vegetius Renatus, and Thucydides.48  Wolfe owned a larger selection of 
more contemporary works, many of them by continental authors who wrote on the armies of 																																																								
45 Nelson, General Sir Guy Carleton, 27.  
46 Nelson, General Sir Guy Carleton, 27.   
47 “Right Honorable Guy Carleton died Possessed of,” Bank of England Wills Extracts, 1717-1845, 
Findmypast.co.uk.  
48 “Will of The Right Honorable Sir Guy Carleton Lord Dorchester,” 19 January 1809, PROB 11/1491/161, The 
National Archives, London, United Kingdom. Carleton did have children to whom he would have passed his 
belongings.  
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mainland Europe.  Some of these were Lancelot Turpin de Crissé's Essai Sur l' Art de la Guerre, 
L’Attaque et la Dèfense des Places by Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, and Les Memoires by 
Louis Goulon.49  It is likely that Carleton read the books bequeathed to him by his patron and 
close friend, crystalizing his acceptance of his role as a professional officer.  
 
Subjecthood in the Empire  
In the years leading up to the Seven Years’ War, the British had contact with people and places 
all over the globe, but the empire was still something of an ad hoc accumulation of territories.  It 
consisted of Ireland; Scotland; a stretch of colonies on the North American eastern seaboard 
from the Carolinas to Newfoundland; a handful of Caribbean Islands; and some company 
territories in India.  In the years before the Seven Years’ War, there is no doubt that the British 
government and military machine had experience conquering and assimilating groups of non-
British peoples into the imperial system, but their conquests outside of the British Isles were 
limited in scope and influence.  Britain had control over most of Ireland since the twelfth century 
and had engaged in intermittent warfare with the Scottish since the thirteenth century.  The 
English viewed the Irish and Scottish (particularly the Highland Scots) as culturally inferior, a 
sentiment that sparked military, social, religious, and administrative campaigns in order to 
Anglicize these northern subjects.  Anglicization efforts meant interaction and contact, which 
contributed to the emergence of an overarching British identity.50  Many eighteenth-century 
Britons did not view the Irish, nor the Americans, as culturally British, but they did see them as 
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subjects with obligations to the Crown.51   
Prior to Britain’s immense territorial acquisitions after the Seven Years’ War, British law 
and custom had defined the parameters of subjecthood to a basic extent.  Before the 
transformation of imperial activity in the eighteenth century, Britons had little reason to consider 
the nature of subjecthood beyond the people of the British Isles and people of British birth living 
or working abroad.  The court case Calvin v. Smith in 1608, more commonly called Calvin’s 
Case, was the first time an English court articulated that the status of a subject was vested at birth 
and determined by their place of birth.52  The case ruled that anyone born in English territory 
after 1603 had the right “to enjoy the benefits of English law as subjects of the King.”53  The 
case was brought forward regarding a Scottish child.  The question of Scottish subjecthood status 
was especially pertinent in the early seventeenth century because James IV of Scotland had 
inherited in the throne of England as King James I in 1603.54 
Because James became the king of both England and Scotland, people born in either 
place owed him allegiance, thus they were theoretically guaranteed legal protection, ability to 
sue in court, and “government due by the law of nature,” according to Sir Edward Coke, Chief 
Justice of the Common Pleas, at the time of the case.55  Coke’s opinion of the case became the 
authoritative interpretation.56  In essence, it meant that all people born into the King’s territories 
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were subjects, “regardless of religion, race, or ancestry.”57  Scots born prior to James I’s 
ascension to the throne were not considered subjects of England because they were born under a 
ruler with no connection to the English Crown.  According to historian Hannah Weiss Muller, 
the case also recognized that British subjects could live under different rules of law but share 
allegiance to the same monarch.58  Sir Edward Coke’s report helped clarify the ramifications of 
this case in regards to the rights of the King’s subjects, and who, within the narrow scope of the 
British Isles, was a subject.  The ruling of the case provoked some of the most prominent legal 
thinkers of the time to claim that protection of English law was theoretically included with the 
status of subjecthood. 59  In theory, there were equal benefits and obligations for all subjects.  
 Calvin’s Case, however, did not address the question of subjecthood for individuals 
outside of Scotland who had not been born in the King’s dominion, but whose land became 
British territory after annexation.  Because Calvin’s Case and later cases that dealt with 
subjecthood in the empire, like Craw v. Ramsey and Fabrigas v. Mostyn, did not address this 
issue, when the British Empire expanded, the status of inhabitants of those newly acquired lands 
would be left uncertain and highly debatable.60  British officials, such as Carleton, and the 
inhabitants living within newly British territory would influence and direct policy regarding their 
subjecthood. 
 
The Seven Years’ War and New Territories (1756-1775) 
The Seven Years’ War resulted in the incorporation of many more groups of non-British peoples 																																																								
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into the King’s realm, forcing a reexamination of the concept of subjecthood.  The war led to an 
unprecedented British military presence outside of Europe, especially in North America.61  
Historian Bruce P. Lenman calls this Britain’s first “truly imperial war” and by the end of the 
peace negotiations in 1763, the empire had gained immense territories in North America, a 
handful of West Indian islands, as well as some possessions in India and the East Indies.62  
Despite the custom set by Calvin’s Case, the status of subject did not necessarily 
guarantee the rights or liberties protected by English law in practice.  It was especially after the 
Seven Years’ War that the term subject became a blanket term to incorporate all peoples living 
under British rule, who therefore owed loyalty to the King.  The 1763 Treaty of Paris made it 
clear that land won by Britain in the Seven Years’ War became part of the King’s domain and 
the people living there became the King’s subjects.63  The imperial administration massed these 
peoples together under the name of subject, but among them there were profound differences in 
access to rights and liberties.  Historian Jack P. Greene calls the imperial system “exclusionary” 
and claims that the empire allowed only a proportionally select group of subjects to benefit from 
it.64  For example, the 1689 English Bill of Rights qualified subjects as “being Protestant.”65  
This requirement excluded the majority of those peoples whose land had been ceded to the 
British as a result of the Seven Years’ War, such as Native Americans and French Canadians.66  
However, the British government both in London and on a smaller colonial scale generally 																																																								
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referred to these people as subjects, suggesting a potentially broader definition.  
Historian Poly J. Price points out that even so, the status of subject did not translate to 
political membership or participation, furthering the idea that the term subject was not used for a 
select or privileged group of people within the empire.67  Subjecthood was theoretically equal, 
but subjects were not.  British colonists, for example, pointed to Calvin’s Case to argue that any 
British subject within the King’s dominion had access to English law, but it was clear that not all 
subjects had this privilege.68  Historian Lauren Benton further makes it clear that subjects were 
not equal and the law did not provide clarity on the issue, as there were constant disputes over 
the rights of subjects and debates over what law or laws governed indigenous and conquered 
peoples.69  Despite the gray areas of who was considered a subject and its limitations of inclusion 
in practice, eighteenth-century subjecthood at the most basic level could be boiled down to an 
obligation of loyalty to the king.70   
By this time, Britain saw itself as an empire comprised of diverse peoples who were 
connected to the Crown by expectations of obligation and obedience in return for state 
protection.71  By the 1770s, the British had experienced governing French Canadians and 
“superintending” Indians that inhabited the newly acquired land, two groups that were neither 
English-speaking nor Protestant.72  The empire after the Seven Years’ War was, in essence, 
defined by military and naval power that controlled non-British, however subject, populations.  
Although the people immediately incorporated into the empire after the Seven Years’ War were 
not born under the reigning King and were not Protestant, the 1763 Treaty of Paris declared that 																																																								
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these newly controlled non-British persons were considered subjects who owed allegiance to the 
Crown and were theoretically protected under the law.  
 Included in Britain’s territorial gains after the 1763 Treaty of Paris was the province of 
Quebec.  Stretching from the coast of Labrador on the Atlantic Ocean, through the Saint 
Lawrence River Valley, and to the Great Lakes, Quebec had been under French royal authority 
since the sixteenth century.  There were an estimated 80,000 to 150,000 French-speaking 
inhabitants in the province who had developed unique customs and culture in their isolation from 
France.73  Historian Paul R. Reynolds suggests that the French Canadians were even more 
devoutly Catholic than the Catholic French.74  Their language and religion were two main factors 
that made this population a unique group of new British subjects.   
Carleton acted as the Governor of Quebec from 1768 to 1778, and it was during this time 
that he demonstrated great fluidity in colonial administrative practice regarding subjecthood after 
the Seven Years’ War.75  In June 1768, Carleton was appointed the “Gov. in Chief of the 
Province of Quebec.”76  While the Proclamation of 1763 had set up English law in Quebec, and 
while local ordinances permitted some old French customs, Carleton advocated for further 
political inclusion of the French Canadian population.77  He wanted to include some of the 
French Canadian nobles into the local council because “the only way to make them faithful 																																																								
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subjects is to place a prudent confidence in and employ them.”78  Early on in his public career in 
Quebec, Carleton demonstrated his desire to smoothly integrate the French Canadians into the 
British sphere of subjecthood and control them under imperial power.   
As a British governor and military officer, whose interpretation of his professional 
occupation and his own honor bound him to respect the rights of all subjects, Carleton worked to 
improve the lives and defend the rights of the unrepresented French Canadians.  Not all officers 
would have had this mentality.  Carleton, for example, reformed the province’s court system that 
had been unfairly harsh on the French Canadians, especially in cases in which they owed a small 
amount of debt from exorbitant fees.  His changes angered the English merchants living in 
Quebec who as creditors had benefitted from such corruption.79  Excessive fines were illegal, and 
Carleton was concerned that they were targeted toward a certain group of subjects.  Because of 
the unfavorable political and legal conditions in which the French Canadians lived under British 
rule, it is clear that Carleton’s predecessors in Quebec did not implement ideas of subjecthood 
that aligned closely to those put forth by the ruling of Calvin’s Case.  His successful change of 
the colonial legal system to protect the French Canadians matched the ruling theory behind 
Calvin’s Case that all subjects were protected under English law.  This was one of multiple 
instances in which Carleton sided with the local French Canadian inhabitants.  Carleton’s efforts 
to protect the French Canadians demonstrated his readiness to uphold the law to all people within 
the King’s dominion. 
 
Understanding Non-British Subjects  
Because the British Empire was coming to include more non-British peoples, philosophers and 																																																								
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other scientific thinkers increasingly hypothesized the source of human difference.  This 
emerging body of works and ideas persisted throughout the mid-eighteenth century and has been 
retroactively called the Scottish Enlightenment.  These writers commonly used the term “human 
variety” to encompass discussion related to human characteristics.80  Scottish Enlightenment 
philosophers included Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, James Beattie, George 
Wallace, and John Millar, to name a few.  Many were professors at universities, but not all of 
them were anchored in the academic sphere, such as Wallace.  While there was no ideological 
consensus, many Scottish Enlightenment thinkers concluded that culture, rather than race or skin 
color, was the determining factor of human difference.81  
A contributing element to this argument was the belief in stadial development theory, 
which claimed that the various human cultures existed on a linear scale of civility—they would 
either progress forward or degenerate to savagery over time.82  The scale was based on the 
assumption that humans possess a sense of morality, some more so than others.  Proponents of 
this theory believed that societies existed on different places on the scale because some took 
longer than others to advance forward.  In short, stadial theory was inherently ethnocentric 
because Europeans judged themselves as more civil and moral than Africans and Native 
Americans, for instance.  Seen in the works of Adam Ferguson and John Locke, this theory 
became prominent in the seventeenth century.  In Ferguson’s Essay on the History of Civil 
Society, for example, he wrote “It is in their [the Indians’] present condition that we are to 
behold, as in a mirror, the features of out own progenitors.”83  Ferguson, among other writers, 
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recognized that the British had once been as uncivil as Indians.  The British even saw themselves 
as more advanced than the Catholic French because they held that their religion was superior.84  
Still, they believed people and societies could change and, in theory at least, became equal to the 
Protestant English. 
It is easy to point to the transatlantic slave trade to argue that mid-eighteenth-century 
Britons viewed race as the most telling aspect of human difference—and thereby the deciding 
factor in inferiority.  To do so, however, would be projecting largely a late eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century concept onto a prior time period.  In the mid-eighteenth century, skin color 
was not the primary factor of determining human variety, at least in the minds of metropolitan 
Britons.  Aligned with the stadial theory of human development, James Beattie, for example, 
argued that Africans were two thousand years behind the development of Western Europeans, 
but like a child would inevitably become an adult, savage peoples would become civilized.85 
Historian Roxanne Wheeler argues that religion, civility, and rank were more important in 
defining people.  For example, an English explorer along the Gambia River noted that a group of 
black Christian translators considered themselves white men because of their religious beliefs.  
The Englishman accepted this interpretation and tallied these translators as white men in his 
count of the individuals on the expedition, not believing that skin color was bound to certain 
characteristics in the mid eighteenth century.86  While a quick look at the British Empire’s 
involvement in the slave trade could suggest that the British believed in African racial inferiority, 
in reality, they believed Africans existed further behind on the scale of cultural development.  To 
the British, it was not African’s skin color that made them inferior, but their perceived barbaric 																																																								
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culture.   
Not coincidentally, developing in parallel with these ethnocentric ideas of human variety 
was the increasing questioning of slavery through articulating natural law notions of human 
liberty.  It is important to note that one of the chief aspects of Britons’ self-perception of their 
uniqueness and superiority was the maintenance and refinement of liberty throughout their 
history, while neighboring European countries had experienced long bouts of absolutism.87  This 
made the British proud of their identity.  Some of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers 
theoretically looked to expand these proudly held concepts of human liberty to a broader group 
of people, particularly Africans who were being integrated into the empire through the slave 
trade.  Adam Ferguson, for example, wrote in his Essay on the History of Civil Society that all 
people deserve to protect their own liberty and that “he who pretends to bestow [liberty] as a 
favour, has by that very act in reality denied.”88  Here, Ferguson criticized the argument that 
slavery actually saved Africans from their own perceived inferior culture.   
The Scottish Enlightenment philosophers also questioned slavery within arguments about 
the public good, human nature, individual happiness, human rationality, religion, and human 
empathy.89  Francis Hutcheson, for instance wrote that “no endowments, natural or acquired, can 
give a perfect right to assume power over others without their consent,” indicating that slavery 
goes against human nature.90  James Beattie argued similar ideas.  These writers cannot be called 
abolitionists, however, as they did not implore the end of the slave trade nor slavery.  The 
Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, to add, were by no means the first to write about the horrors of 
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slavery.  Spanish and Portuguese commentators condemned the slave trade as early as 1569.91  
Historian Christopher L. Brown points to early antislavery sentiment’s ability to cause moral 
doubt, but inability “to stimulate political action,” allowing it to “lay dormant, inert, and 
ineffective in the Anglo-American world” until the end of the eighteenth century.92  The Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers were among the writers who were able to raise moral doubt.  Through 
applying ideas of laws of nature and societal organization, and expanding upon them, to the 
institution of African chattel slavery, these thinkers questioned its place in an empire that prided 
itself on human liberty.    
 Carleton existed within the British imperial system that, for the first time, was being 
pushed by a philosophical movement to question its extensive involvement in the slave trade. 
Historian Iain White argues that the Scottish Enlightenment did little to threaten the institution, 
but it created arguments upon which later abolitionists would expand.93  Historian Robin 
Blackburn also points out that many of these writers’ arguments were ethnocentric and failed to 
confront the root of slavery ideology.94  However, the Scottish Enlightenment revealed that 
decades before the beginnings of the more visible abolition movement, there were people in the 
British Empire who were deeply concerned about the morality of the slave trade.  They were 
laying down some of the ideological foundations on which abolitionism in the Anglo-American 
world would rest.  There is no evidence that Carleton read Scottish Enlightenment works, but 
these Enlightenment ideas were not purely marginal.  Carleton’s actions in Quebec suggest that 
he was likely thinking along the same lines of some of these philosophers—that people within 
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the British Empire, which prided itself on its claims to respect and protect natural human liberty, 
should not be discounted due to their customs, ethnicity, or race.  
 
Conclusion  
Since entering the army in his youth, the imperial systems of patronage, professionalism, and 
subjecthood bound Carleton’s life under the umbrella of the British Empire.  Carleton abided by 
the rules and met the expectations of these developing systems, allowing him to advance in the 
military ranks and public service sphere.  He experienced these systems when the empire was 
expanding its territorial reach, and, not coincidentally, when Scottish Enlightenment thinkers 
were beginning to question its involvement in the slave trade.  He took actions that stood out as 
just because they reflected the extensive ideal of subjecthood in the empire, rather than what 
British officials commonly practiced in the North American colonies.  He likely believed in the 
superiority of the British people and their culture, but did not push non-British peoples to 
“improve” by adopting British customs.  His acceptance and toleration of the differences among 
the King’s subjects reflected his sense of duty toward all of them.   
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Chapter 2: Governor of Quebec and Defender of Empire, 1770s  
Introduction 
While the thirteen English colonies were experiencing unrest in the early 1770s, Carleton 
continued to push for reforms benefitting the French Canadians in Quebec.  His attempts to aid 
these newly incorporated British subjects further suggests his sense of official duty to all citizens 
of the British Empire regardless of national origin.  Carleton later expanded his judicial reforms 
and helped establish a new system of provincial government with the Quebec Act of 1774.  
Under the Quebec Act, an official government for the province formally replaced the temporary 
one established in the 1763 Treaty of Paris.95  The act was supportive of these new British 
subjects, but it infuriated the already unsettled colonists to the south.  Continental Congress, for 
example, in October of 1774, even wrote An Address to the Inhabitants of the Province of 
Quebec that pointed out the “pernicious” effects of the act and urged the French Canadians to 
recognize the government’s audacious “abuse…of royal authority.”96 
Carleton’s supportive relationship with the French Canadians would not last.  When they 
did not rally to defend Quebec against American rebels in the spring of 1775, Carleton quickly 
condemned them, as subjects were expected to be loyal to the empire and its causes in order to 
receive the King’s protection.  As unrest turned to revolution in the thirteen colonies, he 
reproached the unwillingness of non-“British” subjects, such as the French Canadian and Indian 
subjects, to stand and fight for the empire.97  His attitudes towards French Canadian and Indian 
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subjects are thus discernible; his attitude toward black slaves or free peoples of African descent 
during this period of his time in Quebec is less obvious.  He would have had few interactions 
with them, as there was only a sparse black population at this time in Quebec.98  Even so, his 
treatment of Indians might be suggestive of his overall attitudes towards non-white subjects of 
the Crown.   
Carleton’s actions reveal that he believed the empire was in the best interests of all 
subjects, even those allegedly misguided people who no longer wanted that status.  His highest 
priority was preserving the empire’s control in North America.  Carleton did not always favor 
naturally born British subjects nor did he always vouch for the marginalized; instead, his actions 
were driven by the needs of British imperial institutions and governance.  In the case of a 
threatened imperial order, Carleton demonstrated his prioritization of subjects as a means to 
ensure the empire’s continuity.  
 
The Quebec Act  
Carleton held a sincere commitment to improving the functioning of the imperial system; his 
immense efforts in directing the Quebec Act’s creation and pushing it through Parliament 
demonstrate as much.  Carleton believed that the act would make Quebec less likely to join the 
growing rebellion in the south.99  Since the Proclamation of 1763, Quebec had been incorporated 
into the British Empire, but the province still lacked a permanent government.100  Quebec, after 
all, was a new British colonial acquisition in North America with a large population.  In 1770, 
Carleton sailed to England hoping to influence the process in person, rather than remain victim to 
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slow written correspondence.101  Carleton, as well as Lord Hillsborough, the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, believed his advice would be essential in reviewing the Board of Trade’s 
recommendations regarding Quebec.102  In a petition to the King, almost 60 French Canadians 
wrote that Carleton “perfectly comprehends the Condition of this Colony” and that they trusted 
him to represent them, particularly the elite seigneurs, before the Crown and lawmakers.103   
Distracted by the restive colonies to the south, officials based in London had little 
incentive to prioritize discussions of a new government for Quebec.104  Carleton waited three 
years in London before Parliament would again seriously discuss the province, and meanwhile, 
Lieutenant-Governor Hector Cramhé governed Quebec during Carleton’s extended absence.105  
Although the metropolitan officials were preoccupied with the southern colonies, Carleton spent 
his time in London planning and working to obtain approval for various infrastructural 
improvements for his province, specifically a citadel.106  His desire to oversee the building of a 
defensive structure suggests his interest in asserting and defending British imperial authority in 
the newly claimed territory.  While again his concerns would eventually fall wayside to the 
rebellious coastal colonies, Carleton spent his time in London trying to prove the wellbeing and 
service of those living within his province.  
As other British officials grew concerned that the southern colonists’ complaints about 
the empire would spread north, they too turned their attention to Quebec.  It was the Boston Tea 
Party in December of 1773 that sparked lawmakers into action.  In response, Parliament passed 
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the Coercive Acts in March 1774 in an attempt to curb the southern colonists.  Three months 
later, Lord North introduced a bill regarding Quebec’s government to Parliament.107  The bill 
faced immense opposition that echoed the southern colonists’ anxieties.  Namely, those who 
opposed the bill rejected the proposals to give all real power to the royal governor without the 
check of a locally elected assembly, suspend English law, and protect the Catholic Church.108  
Many of the act’s provisions went against English custom and belief—Lord Chatham and 
Edmund Burke declared it to be “despotic, cruel, oppressive, and odious.”109    
Carleton, on the other hand, favored the bill because he knew it would please his French 
Canadian subjects.  He believed that this was the kind of government that French colonists 
wanted because it preserved a system similar to what they had under the French Empire.  When 
he gave his testimony in support of the act in both houses of Parliament during the debates, he 
communicated the opinions of the French Canadians.  He noted that civil trials were in English, 
for instance, “a language they do not understand,” and the French Canadian opposition to trial by 
jury was “pretty unanimous.”110  He also explained that French Canadians did not desire an 
elected assembly, as “they had occasioned such riots and confusion, that they wished never to 
have one of any kind whatsoever.”111  When prodded further on that topic, as the English 
ardently believed in the right to an elected assembly, he responded “but if there should be one, 
they [the French Canadians] ought to have a share in it.”112  Carleton’s testimony suggests that 
he wanted lawmakers to understand the precise difficulties the French Canadians faced under 
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British rule, and that he believed the Quebec Act would lay out the “freest form of government… 
to the present state of the colony.”113  He wanted to provide the French Canadians with a set of 
laws that would enable them to live as they had hoped under the British Empire and saw the act 
as a necessary means to provide stable governance.  
In the summer of 1774, Parliament and the King approved the Quebec Act.  In its final 
form, it included the expansion of the territory of Quebec, freedom for the French Canadians to 
practice Catholicism, and the maintenance of French customs through civil law.114  It reflected 
many of Carleton’s suggestions in order to improve his province, which he saw as an important 
piece of the empire.115  For example, Carleton and other officials successfully advocated that the 
bill expand the territory of Quebec.  Under the new act, Quebec reached entirely around the 
Great Lakes; south to the eastern banks of the Mississippi River and the western bank of the 
Ohio River; and northwest through Labrador to the sea.116  Carleton was also the primary 
advocate that “Persons professing the Religion of the Church of Rome” be able to practice freely 
and hold public office.117  The Quebec Act reveals that Carleton strove to maintain and improve 
the functioning of the empire for its subjects, especially in a time of increasing chaos in another 
part of the empire, the thirteen colonies to the south. 
The Quebec Act helped officially incorporate non-British peoples into the empire without 
forcing them to fully adapt to British ways.  According to Carleton, many French Canadians 
expressed “the strongest Marks of Joy, and Gratitude, and Fidelity to The King, and to his 
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Government, for the late Arrangements made at Home in their Favor.”118  Carleton’s opinion of 
the French Canadians likely represented the thoughts of the elite seigneurs and the Catholic 
clergy, especially since he regularly interacted with these classes.119  Local elites, or seigneurs, 
were an important part of the hierarchy of the empire and their satisfaction was more important 
than the people considered below them.  The majority of French Canadians, called habitants in 
French, however, seemed indifferent toward the act.  Historian Mark R. Anderson notes that 
there is little to no evidence of the habitants’ reactions to the act, if they even expressed any.120  
They were likely pleased that they could continue to freely practice Catholicism, but since it had 
not been banned under the Proclamation of 1763, they may not have known that there was the 
possibility of its prohibition.  The act particularly catered to the desires of the French Canadian 
upper classes, reassuring them that British rule would not undermine their social status or 
practice of traditional customs. 
While Carleton saw the Quebec Act as an improvement of imperial governance, its 
timing coincided with and aggravated other colonial grievances against the empire.  The Anglo 
subjects living in Quebec scorned the act because it conflicted with provisions established in the 
Proclamation of 1763 for “his majesty’s antient, and faithful, and protestant subjects,” as well as 
customs of English law.121  In a letter to Carleton, the Earl of Dartmouth reproached him for 
showing “the King’s new adopted Subjects” more “justice and propriety” than “the natural born 
subjects.”122  As in years prior, Carleton had affected policy in Quebec in favor of the French 
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Canadian majority population.  In the case of the Quebec Act, however, it seemed to backfire on 
Carleton and the lawmakers in London, as rebellious colonists added it to their list of grievances 
against the British government.123  From the point of view of the rebelling delegates to the 
Continental Congress, the Quebec Act was an outrageous and illegal assertion of royal authority, 
not an attempt to provide fair and proper governance to the Catholic population of French 
Canadians who had been dragged into a devoutly protestant empire.124  The Quebec Act 
succeeded in keeping “his [Carleton’s] province quiet and loyal,” but it stirred up more than 
expected in the southern colonies.125 
 
Preparations to Defend Quebec  
Shortly after the first shots were fired at Lexington and Concord, rebel forces captured the 
British forts of Crown Point and Ticonderoga.  Not only were these garrisons equipped with 
ammunition and other supplies, but their location in northern New York and along Lake 
Champlain opened an invasion route into the province of Quebec.126   
 According to biographer Paul R. Reynolds, Carleton was shocked at the outbreak of 
rebellion.127  As a man who had spent his life both serving and being served by the British 
Empire, he saw rebellion as absurd.  His reaction to the rebellion highlights his conviction that 
the empire benefitted all its subjects.  The institutions within the empire had benefited Carleton 
since his youth—he was born into a decent family and made his way up the military chain of 
command through the patronage of others.  It is possible that he could not understand how other 
subjects were so discontented with the governance system, as he had been able to use it to his 																																																								
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advantage to eventually become a royal governor.  Most subjects did not have the same luxuries 
that Carleton did, nor were they able to use the existing systems to become so successful.  
Carleton received all of the liberties under English law, but these theorized benefits of 
subjecthood did not extend to all subjects in practice.  Carleton’s status of privilege not only 
positioned him to question the rebels to the south, but he would condemn the French Canadians’ 
lack of commitment to the British Empire.  
 After hearing the news that the rebels had taken Crown Point and Ticonderoga, Carleton 
made Montreal his headquarters and immediately worked to raise militias.  Montreal would 
likely be the next target of approaching rebel forces, as it was the next British Canadian 
Map 2: Towns, settlements, and forts of the province of Quebec and the northern thirteen 
colonies. Map from Anderson, The Battle for the Fourteenth Colony, 59. 	
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stronghold moving north from Crown Point.128  To augment his small contingent of regular 
troops, Carleton called upon "the Noblesse of this Neighbourhood… to collect their Inhabitants, 
in order to defend themselves,” but the nobles’ efforts were met with little response.129  He 
reported that although “the gentlemen testified great zeal… neither their entreaties or their 
example could prevail upon the people.”  He went on to call the “Canadian peasantry” backward 
in their refusal to take up arms, showing Carleton’s shift in attitude from supportive to critical of 
this population of subjects when they demonstrated disinterest in serving the empire.130  In the 
entire province, Carleton had "not six hundred Rank & File for Duty upon the whole Extent of 
this great River, not an armed Vessel, no places of Strength,” making the need for militia 
enlistments urgent. 131  He resorted to martial law on June 9, 1775, which resulted in further 
discontent.132  Many of the rural inhabitants refused to take up arms, refused commissions, and 
even “rose up in Arms” in protest when government sympathizers tried to mobilize them.133 
There was a wide gap between how the French Canadians acted as new subjects and 
Carleton’s expectations of them.  The French Canadian subjects were less beholden to their 
leaders than Carleton expected they should be.  The hierarchical imperial system had defined his 
life and he had worked his way up by meeting the expectations of his superiors.  Even as a 
governor, Carleton was obliged to follow the instructions of his superiors in London.  He 
expected those lower on the social hierarchy, like the habitants, to follow their superiors, like the 
seigneurs.  In Carleton’s mind, the Québécois were disrupting the order of the empire and its 
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hierarchy.  Carleton noted that “too many of his British American subjects… think [it is] their 
undoubted right” to challenge the system, and he was concerned that the French Canadian 
peasantry had been “tainted” by their seditious assertions.134  The widespread refusal among the 
peasantry to defend the province reveals that the habitants, seigneurs, and Carleton, all had 
different understandings of national loyalty.  
 
Indians in Between Empire and Rebellion  
Native North Americans played significant roles in the conflict between the British Empire and 
its thirteen rebelling colonies, as they inhabited the continent despite British or rebel claims to 
land.  Since the 1760s, some Indians had “sought ways to end or diversify their trade with 
Britain,” fearing they would lose their independence if they relied solely on one empire for 
commerce.135  Other Indian nations, such as the Mohawks in the northeast, wanted to maintain 
their relationships with the British Empire in order to keep colonists off of their defined territory.  
Some, such as the Catawbas in the southeast, saw their interests align with the rebels.136   Most 
Indians, however, like the Quebec colonists, initially preferred not to get involved in a war 
between Britain and its subjects in the thirteen colonies.  The dynamics among the British, the 
rebelling colonists, and the hundreds of Indian groups in the eastern half of the continent 
constantly changed during the course of the war.  In many cases, Indian neutrality proved 
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impossible, however, because their trading networks and ways of life had become intertwined 
with those of the settlers and the empire. 
British officials like Carleton would have considered Indians who lived within the King’s 
territory to be a type of subject in the loosest sense.  Of course, there were many different kinds 
of subjects, and they were not equal.  This classification as a type of subject works because the 
British expected them to act under British authority and maintain their promises of loyalty to the 
empire—Indian nations who had not allied with the British did not fall under this category.  In 
1767, Carleton wrote to William Johnson, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the Northern 
District, that “all the king’s subjects should be considered as brothers, or one family” in regards 
to open trade between Indians and the British.137  This request to Johnson suggests Carleton’s 
ideology of expansive subjecthood.   
In reality, however, Indians existed autonomously from the Crown, and when Indian 
nations and the British worked together, their relationships can be better described as allies 
because Indians acted outside of the internal social hierarchy of the empire.  Indians were also 
considered clients who fought on the behalf of the British, but not without their own goals in 
mind.138  For centuries, the British had operated under the beliefs that Indians were savages, and 
they were not guaranteed rights and privileges of subjects.  Most Indians, of course, neither 
wanted the status of subject nor the implications that came with it.  Although the Crown 
theoretically claimed authority over allied Indians, British officials knew that they struggled for 
on-the-ground control over them.139   																																																								
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Some Indians within British territory may have abstractly seen themselves as subjects to 
a foreign king, but in practice they acted as sovereign peoples free from British authority.  
Calvin’s Case, as previously discussed, also established a legal concept that allowed existing as 
subjects to the monarch but living under a different system of laws.140  The Wampanoags in the 
seventeenth century, for instance, viewed themselves as sovereign peoples, as well as subjects to 
the distant King.141  No matter their beliefs about their subjecthood to a foreign king, to Indians, 
imperial borders drawn on maps meant little on the ground, where they continued to occupy and 
defend their sovereign territories.  The British and Mohawks, for instance, were allies and 
sovereign nations.  From the Mohawks’ perspective, they lived in Mohawk country, not the 
British Empire.142  In the eyes of British officials, Indians were vastly different from other 
subjects, as well as more independent from the Crown; nonetheless, they expected Indian support 
during conflict just as they would with any other loyal subjects.  
 
Indians in Quebec  
Because General Gage was unable to send more regular troops for Carleton’s efforts to defend 
Quebec, and militia enlistments were scant, he encouraged Carleton to turn to the strength of the 
loyal Indians in order to help defend the province.143  The Indians in the province of Quebec and 
in upper New York, however, had their own agendas and would not agree to join the war simply 
because British officials wanted them to.  In 1775, Carleton wrote to the Earl of Dartmouth that 
“the Indians showed as much backwardness as the Canadian peasantry” for not being eager to 
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join the conflict.144  Eventually, however, the conflict shattered the unity of the Iroquois League, 
as the Oneidas and most of the Tuscaroras sided with the rebels, while the Mohawks, Cayugas, 
and Senecas remained loyal to the British.145  The Abenakis hoped to remain neutral as well, but 
their homeland of Vermont and New Hampshire became a theater of war early on, making it 
almost impossible for them to keep out of the conflict.146  The Seven Nations, made up of the 
Indian communities living along the St. Lawrence River, were also reluctant to enter into an 
armed conflict.147  The Caughnawagas, of the Seven Nations, had noticed the French Canadians’ 
hesitancy to fight for the British, adding to their skepticism of entering a war between colonists 
and their king.148  The Mahicans, who lived in New England and had religious ties to New 
England Congregationalists, declared their alliance with the rebels in August 1775.149  While 
most of the Indians within and around the province would have preferred to remain neutral, 
many worked with one or both sides of the conflict in order to maintain their autonomy. 
As the governor of the province in which many Indians were living, Carleton expected 
their loyalty to the Crown and support in suppressing the rebels.  In early February of 1775, he 
wrote to General Gage that “if I am not greatly deceived in my intelligence, not only the 
domiciles of the province but all the neighboring Indians are very much at your disposal 
wherever you are pleased to call upon them, and what you recommend shall be complied 
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with.”150  Carleton’s sources, whatever they were, deceived him.  There was fierce competition 
between the British and rebels to secure Indian alliance, however, Carleton expected allegiance 
from Indian nations—from the British perspective, the Indians were bound to support the King. 
Although many Indians were already hesitant to join the war, Carleton’s fierce responses 
toward perceived Indian disloyalty pushed some groups even farther away from supporting the 
Crown.  In the spring of 1775, a party of British regulars found a group of Mahicans near 
Montreal carrying a secret message intent on persuading other tribes to “fight the King’s Regular 
Troops.”151  The message they carried was from Ethan Allen, the rebel colonel who led the 
capture of Ticonderoga.  The letter conveyed that “Captain Abraham Nimham of Stockbridge, as 
our [the rebels’] ambassador of peace” would try to persuade the Caughnawagas to “not fight for 
King George against us as we have done you no wrong and would choose to live with you as 
brothers.”152  The regulars bound the Mahican messengers and carried them to Montreal where 
they were sentenced to hang as traitors to the Crown—the ultimate claim of British 
sovereignty.153  Indian bands of the Seven Nations came to Montreal to protest the sentence, and 
some even offered to “take their place, and die for them.”154  The Caughnawagas had refused the 
British call to fight and hoped to remain neutral, but after this incident they claimed to “know 
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who are our enemies.”155  At first, Carleton was unyielding, but when the Indian leaders 
suggested that they would no longer support the British if the Mahicans were hanged, Carleton 
acquiesced.  
This incident reveals that Carleton, like other British officials, knew that the support and 
cooperation of Indians would be essential in combatting the rebel forces, especially since the 
French Canadian subjects had no interest in the fight.  Carleton demonstrated this sentiment 
when he wrote “circumstanced as we are, no other measure is likely to Secure the Province.”156  
His reaction to the alleged traitors reveals the expectations of utmost loyalty to the king, just like 
he expected from the French Canadians.  Perhaps Carleton thought that severe punishment would 
deter other Indians from questioning British authority, but he backed down at the possibility of 
them joining rebellion against the empire.  
After his confrontation with the Mahicans and the Caughnawagas, Carleton pursued 
diplomatic means in order to gain the support of the Indians in and around the province—he sent 
envoys with gifts, made promises of future benefits, and appealed to their long-held friendships 
with the British.157  In July 1775, Carleton attended a Grand Iroquois council meeting at 
Montreal in order to plea for their support.158  The Oneidas and Tuscaroras did not attend, and 
the few Cayugas, Senecas, and Onondagas that did attend opted for neutrality.159  
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Representatives from the Seven Nations and other regional Indians, like the Abenakis, were 
there, as well.160  
At the council, Carleton was met with varied responses.  To the Mohawks, Carleton 
promised to restore their lost land if they worked with the British to suppress the rebels.  
Although the official Mohawk stance was neutrality, many of the Mohawks leaned toward the 
British side.  The Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Canada, Guy Johnson, wanted to actively 
oversee an army of Indians on behalf of the British.  Along with Johnson, Mohawk leader Joseph 
Brant tried to convince Carleton to allow the Mohawk warriors to raid rebels within Mohawk 
Valley, but Carleton did not permit it.161  In fact, Carleton “did not think it prudent to let 
[Indians] go beyond the 45th degree latitude, or over the Province line,” for fear that Indian raids 
would push the protesting colonists further into rebellion.162   
While Carleton did not want the Mohawks raiding rebel property, he needed their support 
as scouts for the British.  Depicted in a painting by contemporary artist Benjamin West, Carleton 
tried to persuade them to break their official neutrality and act as obedient servants to British 
officials and generals.  According to art historian Paul Staiti, this painting no longer exists, but 
there is evidence of its subject.163  The Mohawks eventually sided with the British, and Joseph 
Brant even travelled to London in order to affirm their loyalty to the King.  Unlike Carleton, the 
new Secretary of State for the American Department, Lord George Germain, believed that the 
use of Indians in raids and warfare would greatly benefit their efforts against the rebels.  Under 
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the approval of Germain and Johnson, the Mohawks would conduct raids against the rebels.164  
Carleton’s judgment against the raids suggests that he wanted to keep the possibility of 
reconciliation with the rebels available.  
The Abenakis of Odanak did not want to enter the conflict, but because of the location of 
their territory at a key point of the St. Lawrence River, they found themselves in the middle of 
British and rebel fighting.165  Some Abenakis took action by agreeing to act as scouts at 
Carleton’s request, while others fled their increasingly dangerous homeland.  British officials 
pressured them to support the Crown through coercion and gift exchange, and Indian agents were 
so pushy and persistent that an Abenaki woman on the Androscoggin River claimed that her 
band could not hunt, eat, or sleep without being bothered by British officials.166  By 1776, many 
Abenakis were feeling so much pressure to fight with the British that they fled southern Quebec 
to settle closer to American settlements in New England.167   
Carleton directed those Abenakis that agreed to act as scouts to set up camps in Montreal, 
to station some of their men at St. Jean, and to monitor the rebels near Lake Champlain.168  Just 
as he forbade the Mohawks, Carleton ordered the Abenakis not to cross the Province line into 
New York or New England.169  Because of Carleton’s persistent, albeit ambivalent, actions to 
control Indian wartime efforts, it is clear that he worried about Indian raiding further angering 
colonists and amplifying the rebellion.170 
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In 1776, Carleton continued to take advantage of the intelligence-gathering skills of 
Indian scouts while keeping them under close watch.  In his account of the 1776 campaign near 
Valcour Island, Lieutenant William Digby of the 53rd Regiment of Foot noted that the Indians 
“were much encouraged by gen. Carlton as useful to the army.”171  Digby’s account makes it 
clear that Carleton believed their skills as scouts were vital, as “the day passed over in the 
greatest state of uncertainty” without any word from the Indian scouts on the banks of the 
Champlain.172  In the case of Valcour Island, Carleton limited their involvement and forbade 
them from taking up arms for the empire, yet kept them nearby and under British command. 
Carleton’s biographer Paul R. Nelson questions his decision not to use more Indian 
warriors in combat, but Carleton’s restraint stemmed from political strategy and ideological 
perspectives.173  Nelson believes that because of “the leanness of his military resources,” 
Carleton should have “given more attention to the used of Indians.”174  In what capacity should 
Carleton have implemented the Indians Nelson does not make clear, however, he seems to 
believe that between Guy Johnson, his cousin Sir John Johnson, and Carleton, the British 
administration had great influence over the Indians.  Nelson seems to overestimate British power 
over the Indians and does not take into account that many of them had reluctantly joined the 
British side.  Additionally, Carleton knew that he walked a thin line with the Indians, as he had 
not always taken friendly means to gain their support.  Being first and foremost a military man, 
Carleton likely worried about the possibility of the Indians turning against loyal forces.  
Although the Indian nations acted autonomously from the empire, it did not make sense for 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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Carleton to sanction the martial freedom of potentially dangerous peoples, but to keep them 
under close watch.  
Many British officials like Carleton felt they could not implement the Indians in warfare.  
In October 1775, he wrote to the Earl of Dartmouth in “fear the innocent might have suffered 
with the Guilty” if he had allowed Indians to raid properties of the rebelling colonists.175  The 
colonists who were not actively involved in inciting rebellion were “innocent” from Carleton’s 
perspective, while the “Guilty” were those who were actively opposing the empire, particularly 
rebel leaders and the Continental Army.  Some British officials made the distinction between 
these two groups, as Carleton demonstrated when he expressed he did not want to “let them [the 
Indians] loose” against the colonists or the rebel militias.176  According to historian Ethan A. 
Schmidt, Carleton did not trust them and feared that Indian methods of warfare would only cause 
more colonists to side with the rebels.177  In the same letter to Dartmouth, Carleton defended his 
position by explaining that he wanted to treat the rebels with “as much Humanity as our own 
Safety would permit.”178  He knew that the Indians were capable of creating fear and destruction 
in an already fraying part of the empire, and his notions of humanity fit with a strategy of not 
worsening the rebellion. 
Carleton’s comments to the Earl of Dartmouth indicate the differences between Anglo-
American and indigenous-American warfare and subjecthood.  Carleton suggested that it was 
inappropriate to permit Indian warfare, which could consist of ambush and scalping, against the 
colonists.  Not only would the use of Indians against the rebelling colonists be cruel, but it would 
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also disrupt the hierarchy of subjects, as Anglo-American subjects saw themselves superior to 
Indians.  It was out of the question in his mind to allow the Indians, perceived as lesser subjects, 
to combat Anglo-American subjects.  Carleton was under the impression that the colonists could 
be persuaded back into the empire, and using Indians to do so would only further anger and 
rebellion.  There were different kinds of subjects with different roles and relationships to the 
empire, and the rebellion forced decisions about balancing them.   
Because of the rebelling colonists’ challenge to their status as subjects, British officers 
practiced inconsistent strategies of waging war against the colonists—some saw them as British 
subjects who needed to be guided back into the imperial system, while others saw only as traitors 
and rightly deserving the harshest treatment for challenging imperial authority.179  Carleton’s 
desire to protect the rebelling colonists from the potential brutality of Indian warfare suggests 
that he still saw them as British subjects.  In 1775, the thirteen colonies had not yet declared 
independence and were still part of the British Empire, thus the inhabitants were still British 
subjects.  Carleton hoped that he and other British officials could coax them out of rebellion in 
order to preserve its strength and integrity in North America, not drive them further away from 
reconciliation.  
 
Conclusion  
Sir Guy Carleton left a mark on the 1770s in the form of the Quebec Act and through how he 
directed those within the empire as rebel forces approached the province.  He influenced policy 
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and led the preparations to defend Quebec in the name of and for the prosperity of the British 
Empire.  His personal background and correspondence suggest that he believed protest against 
the empire was not only foolish but incomprehensible.  In the face of increasing unrest, he 
worked to secure imperial control in Quebec by securing the loyalty of the French Canadians and 
attempting to gain the backing of Indian subjects.  He used his influence in Parliament as well as 
his position as governor to allow peoples of different cultures to continue their ways within 
British territory, as long as they were under the controlling hand of the empire.   
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Chapter 3: Carleton’s Last Effort for Empire, 1780-1783  
Introduction  
Sir Guy Carleton had just dined with Chief Justice William Smith, but he called for another 
audience with his trusted advisor on August 2, 1782 to “divulge what he could not” the day 
before.180  Carleton had received news of an unexpected turning point, and he had to relay it to 
General Washington before he could discuss it with Smith.181  After eleven weeks of silence, 
word from Lord Shelburne in London had finally reached Carleton that “the King had instructed 
his Commissaries at Paris… to agree to the Independency of the Colonies.”182  This came to a 
surprise to Carleton, as just months before he had agreed to come out of retirement and return to 
America under the impression that he and Rear Admiral Robert Digby would spearhead peace 
with the colonies through reconciliation, not independence.183  In May, he had even written to 
General Washington that Britain was ready to begin peace negotiations—excluding 
independence.184   
After a decade of governing Quebec, Carleton had retired to England in 1778.  While in 
retirement, the rebellion in the thirteen North American colonies waged on, and in July of 1776 
the colonies had declared their independence from Britain as the “thirteen united States of 
America.”185  The empire, of course, did not recognize their claim of independence and 
continued to fight with the goal of controlling these colonies once again.  France had even 																																																								
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entered the war on the American side in 1778.  The conflict had lasted longer than the British 
expected and, along with governing other parts of the empire, it was draining their financial 
resources.  Most of the fighting ended after the American victory at the battle of Yorktown in 
1781—people immediately had different ideas of what the peace terms would look like.  In 
February of 1782, the government had asked Carleton to come out of retirement to act as the 
commander in chief and “Commissioner for restoring Peace” in America.186  In order to fulfill 
his duty and with hopes of piecing the North American British Empire back together, he had 
moved to New York City in May 1782.  Unbeknownst to Carleton, however, the new 
Rockingham ministry was ready to give the colonies independence.  
Smith could see Carleton’s disappointment, confusion, and shock.  His diaries note that 
Carleton was “much affected” by the correspondence from London.187  Smith was also unsettled 
by the plan of reconciliation, telling Carleton that there was “Evidence of great internal Debility” 
within the government, yet Carleton “could assign no Reason for the Measure.”188  Also included 
in the letter from Shelburne was the decision that the peace treaty would be negotiated in France 
rather than in North America.  Carleton had believed it would be his “Duty to make the most of 
this great Concession,” but unbeknownst to him, British and American envoys had been 
discussing peace terms in Paris since April, 1782.189  Carleton was likely angry that his authority 
to reconcile with the colonies was no longer applicable.  Even worse, there would be no 
reconciliation at all.  Carleton was shaken and his plans were turned upside down.  
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 Carleton resigned his post as “Commissioner for restoring Peace” two weeks after 
receiving the news of impending independence.  In his request for resignation, he wrote that he 
could no longer render “any considerable service” to the Crown.190  Chief Justice Smith believed 
Carleton asked to be recalled “to stimulate the present Ministry to give him plenipotentiary 
Powers” in negotiations, despite the “Firmness of the present Sett.”191  His perspectives of the 
war and empire, it was clear, did not align with those of the new Rockingham ministry.  
Carleton’s opinions aligned with those of the Tories, or the British conservative party, who 
wanted the colonies to remain within the empire.192  King George III had previously expressed 
the basics of this argument when he protested “forfeiting the Honour and Essential Rights of my 
Kingdom” through granting independence.193  His disappointment and request to resign 
notwithstanding, Carleton maintained his post in New York for another year due to slowness in 
appointing a replacement.   
Discontented with his government’s decision to grant independence, Carleton nonetheless 
remained in New York working on the loose ends of the war from May of 1782 to December of 
1783.  He organized troop movements and evacuations out of New York; he arranged prisoner 
exchanges; he worked to protect and evacuate remaining loyal subjects; and he secured public 
property—all among the many other tasks he carried out in the name of the empire.  In these 
matters he worked alongside other British officials, such as Admiral Digby, and in negotiation 
with the American leaders, such as General Washington.  His perseverance at his post reflected 
his personal notions of what duty and honor required as a professional military servant of the 
king.  He opposed granting independence to the colonies, but he performed his duties as 																																																								
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expected by the government in order to best serve the empire.  As one of the highest-ranking 
British officials in the thirteen colonies at the end of the conflict, Carleton recognized that his 
primary duty was to protect and evacuate the loyal subjects and their property.  It would turn out 
that Carleton’s ideology of subjecthood included the black loyalists who were contested as 
property of American slave owners, and it was his duty, he believed, to see them protected by the 
law.  
 
Loyalists, 1782-83 
The war took a dramatic turn after the defeat of Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781, and by 1782, 
British officials in London were placing their highest priority on the protection of His Majesty’s 
loyal subjects living in the thirteen colonies.  In January 1782, Lord George Germain, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, sent a circular letter to the colonial governors ordering the 
“utmost Attention shewn to their [the loyalists’] Safety and Welfare.”194  Along with evacuating 
the army and public property, including artillery, one of his principal duties was to show his 
“tenderest and most honourable care” to the loyalists.195  The war had driven tens of thousands of 
loyal subjects from their homes to areas held by the British Army, then including New York 
City, Savannah, and Charlestown.196  Because of Carleton’s position and authority over the 
British-held cities, these loyalist refugees were in his care.  In April 1783, Lord North re-
emphasized Carleton’s duty, stressing that he should continue his “Exertions to mitigate their 
[the loyalists’] Distresses, wherever Opportunities shall present themselves.”197  British 
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protection had given way to wholesale evacuation in the summer of 1782 when it became clear 
that America would receive independence. 
Parliament’s announcement of its intention to grant American independence shocked and 
frightened the loyalists.  Carleton publicized the news in New York on August 3, 1782.198  
American independence would isolate loyalists from the empire and the king’s protection.  
Furthermore, some loyalists reacted belligerently to the possibility of independence, writing to 
Carleton that their government was deserting them in America.199  Just because most fighting 
had ceased did not mean supporters of the Crown were free from harassment, legal 
discrimination, robbery, injury, or death because of their allegiance.  According to historian 
Maya Jasanoff, the departure of the redcoats “spelled worry” for those who had not supported the 
rebel cause.200  Because of fear, uncertainties of living in America under rebel control, and 
allegiance to king and empire, sixty thousand white loyalists and fifteen thousand black loyalists 
had fled with the British troops by the end of the British evacuation in November 1783.201  As 
His Majesty’s loyal subjects, they were not welcome in the colonies that had just fought against 
their king, so British officials both in London and in the colonies worked to ensure the protection 
of their subjects and the health of the empire elsewhere.  
 
Black Loyalists and British Freedom Promises   
Though the circumstances of white loyalists were precarious at the end of the war, the situations 
of black loyalists were even more uncertain.  Thousands of black loyalists had relocated to 
British-held cities during the war.  Many were slaves who had fled their masters to the safety of 
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British lines, some had been “sequestered” along with estates by the British Army, and some 
were soldiers who had enlisted in the British army toward the end of the war.202  Those who 
received wartime employment as couriers, artisans, laborers, and guides oftentimes received 
emancipation for their service.203  Officers often came to command ex-slaves as personal 
servants, as well, although historian Alan Gilbert notes that it is unclear if the officers saw their 
servants as property or as free.204  Nonetheless, blacks living under the protection of the British 
at the end of the war must have feared what could happen to them once the conflict came to an 
end.  They did not know if they would be re-enslaved in the former colonies, or if they would 
receive freedom as many of them had been promised.  
Fleeing loyalists and rebels alike, black men and women had sought the safety of the 
royal army and British officials throughout the war.  In the first few years of the conflict, black 
loyalists received “tacit protection” behind British lines.205  As early as 1775, the British offered 
black men and women the reward of freedom in order to undermine the rebels’ war effort.  John 
Murray, the royal governor of Virginia and the fourth earl of Dunmore, offered freedom to any 
slave or indentured servant who was willing to take up arms for the British in November 1775.206  
His proclamation led fifteen thousand blacks to join the British side.207  When British forces took 
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New York City in 1776, General William Howe offered refuge to enslaved peoples who had fled 
rebel masters, triggering thousands more to flee to British lines.208 
The British continued to offer sanctuary to blacks throughout the conflict.  In 1779 and 
then again in 1780, British General Henry Clinton proclaimed that blacks could take up an 
occupation within the Royal army, whether that be in the Royal Artillery, the Black Pioneers, or 
as a soldier, in return for their sworn allegiance to the Crown.209  Many blacks considered his 
proclamation an “actual emancipation,” triggering both free and enslaved blacks to come to the 
British side.210  Clinton hoped his declaration would encourage the blacks fighting for the rebels 
to turn coats, however, it was not a promise of explicit freedom.211  Many loyalist slave owners 
wrote to British officials regarding their slaves fleeing “under the sanction of Sir Henry Clinton’s 
Proclamation.”212  Gilbert says that ex-slaves hoped to receive the same benefits as white 
loyalists, land and the rights of an Englishman, when they pledged their allegiance to the 
British.213  When slaves fled to British lines, they gambled their lives for the possibility of 
freedom and rights as British subjects.  
 
End of War Responsibilities  
As British and American commissioners were negotiating a peace treaty in Paris, British officials 
in the colonies worked out how they would handle black fugitives who had come to their lines.  
This was a contentious topic, not least because many of the slaves who had fled to the royal army 
had belonged to loyalist masters.  The British had called for the protection of loyalists and their 
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property, but it was impossible to honor their pledge to both the white loyalists who wanted their 
slaves returned to them and to the loyal black subjects who were counting on the British 
administration’s word.   
The issue of black inclusion only complicated the preparations for a large-scale civilian 
evacuation.  In the 1780s, there was no British precedent for a civilian evacuation of this scale, 
nor for the classification of contested populations.214  Notions of fundamental rights of property 
galvanized rebel slave owners to hunt down their escaped slaves, creating more obstacles for 
both the British and the fleeing blacks.  To make things even worse, when Carleton arrived in 
New York in May of 1782, there were very few ships at his disposal.215  Despite these obstacles, 
Carleton, as well as other British officials in the colonies, ultimately decided that these black 
men and women were British subjects and deserving of protection within the imperial system.  
Carleton received dozens of letters from loyalists requesting aid to help return their slaves 
to them.  In one request dated August 8, 1782, Rawlins Lowndes of Charlestown wrote Carleton 
hoping the British administration would help him find his “valuable house servant woman” who 
had likely escaped to New York.  Like many other slave owners, Lowndes argued that war did 
not warrant “the continual deprivation” of his property.216  Although the loyalist slave owners 
still supported the Crown, they nonetheless wanted the imperial system to return the enslaved 
men and women that they claimed as their property. 
In October of the same year, the matter of white loyalists’ property, or slave, losses 
confronted Carleton from South Carolina.  Under pressure from white loyalists, Lieutenant 
General Alexander Leslie, the commander of the King’s forces in the south, asked for Carleton’s 
direction on the subject of loyalists selling slaves from sequestered estates and keeping the profit 																																																								
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as compensation for their lost property.217  Carleton responded to Leslie in haste, using numbered 
bullet points to quickly address each topic Leslie had written about.  He replied “the situation 
was “left to Genl. Leslie’s decision, to act as he judges best.”218  Carleton could have been 
conflicted over whether to help white loyalists or to uphold British honor by maintaining the 
promises made to black subjects.  As for Leslie’s enquiry about “Respecting other Negroes,” 
Carleton responded in the same bullet-point letter that those who “have been promised their 
freedom, to have it.”219  Carleton’s letter suggests that he wanted Leslie to judge what he saw as 
best for the situation in the south, as long as it ultimately upheld the promises of freedom for 
those who legally deserved it. 
Because the fate of escaped slaves was so contentious in South Carolina, where slave 
labor was the backbone of the economy, Leslie and the rebelling governor of South Carolina, 
John Mathews, had come to an agreement regarding the black population who had fled to British 
lines: those who had served in the British army, or “such Slaves as have rendered themselves 
particularly obnoxious by their attachment and Services to the British Troops” were to remain 
free, and those who had been sequestered were to be “restored to their former Owners as far as it 
is practicable.”220  The agreement angered Governor Mathews because the wording allowed the 
British to take little action to return escaped or captured slaves to their masters, and no escaped 
slave would protest that.  The agreement also set up a commission, composed of both American 
and British representatives, to estimate the value of the slaves who had received freedom, 
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compensate former owners, and search British vessels leaving port for any unauthorized 
slaves.221   
Leslie wrote again to Carleton in October to explain that it would be near impossible to 
facilitate the restoration of black men and women to their former masters.  Leslie cited that 
British officers would not want to be separated with their source of cheap labor and that the 
black men and women were “exceeding unwilling” to return to slavery on the grounds that they 
had been offered freedom by British officials.222  According to historian Jim Piecuch, Leslie 
feared the “monstrous expense” of compensating American slave owners due to the large amount 
of black men and women desired to leave with the British.223  Despite his compromise with 
Governor Mathews, Leslie’s letter to Carleton suggests that he was less than enthusiastic about 
returning captured slaves to their former masters.  Leslie likely believed the provision to return 
captured slaves would be ineffective without great amounts of work, money, and stress on the 
British side.  
Leslie and Governor Mathews’ agreement did not last.  The British naval officers met the 
commissioners coming to inspect the first group of evacuees with protest.  The officers refused 
to allow them to board their ship to check if there were any unauthorized runaways onboard.  
Meanwhile, outside of Charlestown’s fortifications, rebel general Nathanael Greene captured 
three British soldiers.  Seeing the agreement between himself and Mathews as a truce, however 
temporary, Leslie seized in the incident to accuse Greene of violating it by capturing British 
men.  Until the rebels returned the British soldiers, Leslie would prohibit any slaves from leaving 
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the port.  Governor Mathews terminated the commission when he received word of Leslie’s 
actions, resulting in no rebel authority present at the evacuations from Charlestown.224   
With or without the aid of the rebelling governor, Carleton and Leslie wanted the 
evacuation of black men and women to be organized, professional, and therefore safe.  In 
November of 1782, Carleton wrote to Leslie that no black men and women are to be left at port 
“to whom the public faith has been pledged for their freedom.”225  This meant that anyone 
claiming freedom under the sanction of a British official could qualify.  In the same letter, 
Carleton ordered Leslie that no black men or women were “to be taken under pretense of 
belonging to the departments” and that anyone trying to “carry off” a former slave without a 
freedom certificate must pay for them.226  Carleton hoped to prohibit any officers from taking 
advantage of situation and assuming ownership of any of these black men or women under the 
appearance of permitting them freedom under British policy.  Some of these black runaways had 
been incredibly valuable to British officers in their wartime efforts, and many were not opposed 
to securing that aid for after the war.  
Leslie’s response to Carleton suggests that he was more willing to appease the rebel and 
loyalist slave owners than Carleton.  Because “the Treaty entered into with Governor Mathews… 
has been discontinued,” he appointed “A board of Officers” to try to distinguish between the 
black men and women who had been captured during the war and those who had gained freedom 
through service to the Crown.”227  Those who had not officially served the British during the war 
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were at risk of being sent back to their masters.  Unlike Carleton, Leslie would return some 
slaves to their Whig owners.228   
While thousands of black men and women were able to escape their former masters in 
South Carolina and Georgia, many of them were re-enslaved.  According to historian 
Christopher L. Brown, most of these black men and women did not receive freedom, but became 
the property of white loyalists relocating to the Floridas and the Caribbean.229  Approximately 
500 whites and 800 of their slaves fled from Charlestown to St. Augustine, for instance.230  
Unlike in New York, there was no British official to ensure the upholding of freedom promises 
to black men and women.  Leslie and other officials in the southern colonies did not take efforts 
to uphold British freedom promises, but instead allowed these black men and women to be 
returned to a state of enslavement.  It is unclear if Carleton knew that other British officials were 
escorting the fugitive black men and women back into slavery.  
The evacuation of Charlestown was an important precursor to the larger evacuation that 
Carleton knew was soon to occur in New York City, and he did not want to flounder regarding 
his policy of black loyalists.  The situation in Charlestown made it clear to him that this topic 
was highly divisive, but also that the British had the upper hand in the matter because the 
contested population was physically within their lines.  Although initially he had been relatively 
hands-off regarding the specifics of handling the contested population in Charlestown, Carleton 
came to voice his support for the maintenance of British freedom promises.  Because of the 
debate in Charlestown, as well as Savannah, it would be no surprise to him that white 
Americans, both loyalists and rebels, would protest British policy regarding escaped black men 
																																																								
228 Piecuch, Three Peoples, One King, 323.  
229 Brown, Moral Capital, 299. 
230 “A Return of Refugees & their Slaves arrived in this Province from Charlestown at the time of the Evacuation,” 
no. 7468, PRO 30/55/67, TNA. 
	 62 
and women.  Historian Maya Jasanoff claims that Leslie’s handling of the issue would serve as 
Carleton’s “model.”231  In comparison with Leslie, however, Carleton would handle the 
evacuation immensely differently, proving to be much more strict in ensuring liberty to black 
loyalists in New York. 
 
The Treaty of Paris, 1782-83 
While Carleton was dealing with the issue of black loyalists in America, American and British 
negotiators were drafting the provisions of peace in Paris to conclude the war.  On November 29, 
1782, the last day of negotiations for a preliminary peace treaty, a tired and battered American 
representative, Henry Laurens, arrived at the negotiating table.232  One of the largest slave 
owners and slave traders in the mainland colonies, Laurens insisted upon the addition of an 
article that forbade the British from “carrying away of any Negroes, or other Property of the 
American Inhabitants” out of the colonies.233  This clause became Article VII of the peace treaty 
and insinuated that the British return all ex-slaves that had fled to their protection back to their 
masters.  Theoretically, Article VII forbade Carleton from legally preventing slave owners from 
recapturing their escaped slaves.  
Richard Oswald, the chief British negotiator, was Laurens’ “particular friend” and also 
deeply involved in the slave trade.234  Appearing unconcerned that the article suggested a vastly 
different policy than what British officials had been practicing in the colonies, Oswald informed 
Thomas Townshend, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, that negotiators “have 																																																								
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been under the necessity of admitting” the clause.235  Surviving evidence from the negotiations, 
however, does not suggest that Laurens had been particularly adamant about adding the article 
because neither Oswald nor the other British negotiators protested it.236  The British envoys, even 
Oswald, must have known that this article suggested policy that was contrary to what British 
officials had practiced throughout the war, yet Laurens’ and Oswald’s agendas of adding the 
article succeeded.  
 When Article VII, along with the rest of the preliminary peace articles, became public in 
March of 1783, it emboldened slave owners who had lost their property in the war to get their 
slaves back.237  The British still held Manhattan, but slave owners and hired slave catchers 
surrounded the island ready to see their slaves returned or to find them on their own.238  Boston 
King, one of many slaves who had escaped from South Carolina to New York City, wrote that a 
“report prevailed at New-York” that all escaped slaves in the city “were to be delivered up to 
their masters.”239  The black men and women there feared for their lives when they “saw our 
masters coming from Virginia, North Carolina, and other parts, and seizing upon their slaves on 
the streets of New-York, or even dragging them out of their beds.”240  With slave owners at 
large, the British officials and officers were these black refugees’ best hope for ensuring their 
freedom.  
Carleton wanted to make sure that actions to protect the ex-enslaved men and women 
could not be thwarted by anyone who argued that Article VII required black runaways to be 
returned to their masters.  To Carleton, “property” in Article VII meant property at the time the 																																																								
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preliminary peace treaty was signed in November of 1782, so anyone who had responded to 
British calls of freedom “previous to the Treaty” were guaranteed freedom.241  On May 12, 1783, 
Carleton wrote to Washington that “the negroes in question… I found free when I arrived in New 
York,” which he used to justify circumventing Article VII.242  It was hard to know the truth 
about when an enslaved person had fled their master, but Carleton and the Board of Inquiry, the 
body tasked with questioning the fleeing black population, permitted the freedom of runaways 
based on the conveyance of their life histories.  Members of the board, which was composed of 
Americans and British representatives, weekly mediated disputes about runaway slaves in 
Fraunces’s Tavern on Pearl Street during the month of April 1783 from ten ‘til two.243  Even 
without “regular protection or certificates,” members of the Board of Inquiry followed Carleton’s 
attitude regarding the matter and believed the stories of many black refugees who claimed to 
have escaped from rebel masters and fled to the British during the war.244  
Carleton’s interpretation of the Treaty of Paris gave him the confidence and authority to 
protect black men and women in the city.  An early indication of his interpretive lean came in 
December of 1782, when Thomas Willis, a city employee, accepted a bribe from a slave owner 
to return his slave who had escaped to New York City under Clinton’s proclamation.  For this, 
Carleton fined him fifty guineas and exiled him from Manhattan.245  Carleton’s protection of 
black refugees in New York not only infuriated American slave owners, but revealed that his 
interpretation of the peace treaty was radically different from his American counterparts.   
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Although Article VII appeared to bind Carleton’s choice for the refugee black population, 
his conception of subjecthood led him to maintain a different interpretation of the article, in turn 
upholding previous promises to black British subjects.  As a reputable official of the Crown, he 
was careful to act within the lines of the treaty, as an infraction of an international treaty would 
tarnish both his and his country’s honor.246  Any actions that he took while evacuating New York 
would have to be defensible as permitted under the treaty provisions.  In April of 1783, he wrote 
to Robert R. Livingston, the American Secretary of Foreign Affairs, regarding the upcoming 
evacuation of troops and loyalists.  Carleton restated Article VII of the treaty and asked that 
Congress appoint American representatives “to inspect and superintend all Embarkations” at 
New York.247  Carleton conveyed to Livingston his hope that honorable British and American 
superintendents would “represent to me [Carleton] every infraction of the Letter or Spirit of the 
Treaty.”248  This letter suggests that Carleton wanted to ensure that the treaty would be upheld.  
He also took great care, however, to ensure that the black men and women who had fled to New 
York City received freedom.  In order to do both, he interpreted the treaty in a way that allowed 
him to evacuate the black men and women from Manhattan—if they came to British lines before 
November 1782, they were free in Carleton’s eyes.  He likely knew, however, that the American 
negotiators had meant for all escaped black men and women to be returned.  
Because Carleton established a time-based marker, albeit possible to circumvent, for 
declaring a person free or property in the eyes of officials, in the spring of 1783 he justifiably 
began issuing passes of protection to the black men and women who claimed to have fled their 
masters during the war.  If a slave catcher or slave owner tried to recapture a black refugee who 
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had one of these passes, they would be at risk of arrest by British forces.249  Carleton put 
Brigadier General Samuel Birch in charge of seeing the passes made and distributed, and they 
became known as Birch Certificates.250  Less than half a dozen certificates remain in the 
historical record, but those that do reveal their authority rested in Howe and Clinton’s freedom 
proclamations, as well as Carleton’s “Permission to go to Nova-Scotia, or wherever else he may 
think proper.”251  Historian Cassandra Pybus notes that many of the runaways in New York, 
however, boarded evacuation ships before they had been issued a certificate.  The process of 
receiving a certificate was time consuming, and the threat of slave masters in the city pushed 
many to gamble the risk of embarking without the signed document.252  Although the certificate 
distribution was not entirely effective, they suggest that Carleton made efforts to officially 
legitimize the black refugees’ freedom.  
It is also possible that Carleton drew upon the Somerset v. Stewart (1772) case, more 
commonly called the Somerset Case or Mansfield judgment, to justify his treaty interpretation.  
In 1772, Lord Mansfield presided over the landmark Somerset Case—the case was not landmark 
because of its ruling, but because the public and media incorrectly interpreted the case as having 
eliminated slavery within the empire.  In reality, Mansfield ruled that English law did not permit 
a slave owner from forcing his runaway slave, James Somerset, out of England and back to the 
colonies. 253  This case did not eliminate slavery in the colonies, but reaffirmed its illegality in 
England.  Historian Simon Schama argues that the ‘Précis Relative to Negroes’ document 
suggests that the media and public’s “benign misreading of the Mansfield judgment” influenced 
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some of Carleton’s decisions.254  While the author of the Précis is unclear, Schama believes that 
Carleton drafted the account.  It declares that the Board of Inquiry considered the cases of all 
black runaways who had fled to British lines “previous to the Treaty” because “the British 
Constitution [was] not allowing of Slavery.”255  Carleton could have seen the Somerset Case as 
an affirmation to his actions, but since he perhaps only once cited the case, as demonstrated in 
the previous sentence, it was likely not his primary motivation for evacuating black men and 
women.  
  By the spring of 1783, the British had evacuated tens of thousands of black loyalists from 
the colonies.  From New York alone, for instance, 3,000 of the 6,000 refugees headed for Nova 
Scotia were of African descent.  This fleet of British ships no doubt held black refugees along 
with white refugees, some who were technically free and some who were still slaves to a white 
master.256  From the Savannah and Charlestown evacuations in 1782, as many as ten thousand 
black men and women left on British ships.257  At this point, the Americans could do little to get 
their already escaped slaves back.  
 
Carleton Meets General Washington  
The dispute over the black refugees entered the highest level of American military authority 
when General Washington became involved in the spring of 1783.  Carleton and Washington had 
already been in regular correspondence regarding British evacuation and prisoner exchange.  On 
April 21, 1783, however, Washington wrote Carleton with a different subject in mind: Article 
VII of the provisional treaty.  Virginian slave owners had pressured Washington to meet with 																																																								
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Carleton to demand the return of their slaves.258  Washington asked for a personal audience with 
Carleton regarding the “security of american property, agreeably to the 7th. article of the 
provisional treaty and a resolved of Congress of the 15th. of last month.”259  The congressional 
resolve addressed three matters: the freeing of American prisoners; the handing over of British 
posts; and “for attaining the delivery of all Negroes and other property of the Inhabitants of the 
United States” in the possession of the British forces.260  Carleton promptly responded and 
suggested that they meet in Tappan, New York, where Washington was lodged.261   
 On May 6, 1783, Carleton and Washington met face to face for the first time after years 
of long-distance communication.  “An Hour was spent in Congratulations,” then the two generals 
and their parties took to a room for negotiations.262  After discussing the “Liberation of 
Prisoners,” Washington shifted the subject to “the preservation of property… especially the 
Negroes.”263  After Washington had spoken his opening words on the subject, Carleton replied 
that “6000 Souls” had already embarked to Nova Scotia and that he had appointed 
representatives to prevent “Irregular Embarkation of Property.”264  As for the contested black 
population, Carleton added, there was “a Registry that the Owners might eventually be paid for 
the Slaves who were entitled to their Freedom by British Proclamations and Promises.”  Pybus 
suggests that American commissioners overseeing the evacuations had already informed 
Washington of the embarkations, but two first-hand sources, William Smith and Jonathan 																																																								
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Trumbull Jr., documented that Washington acted surprised at the news.  According to William 
Smith’s account of the meeting, Washington acted “startled” and exclaimed, “Already 
imbarked!” in a moment of shock before regaining his composure.265  Even Jonathan Trumbull, 
Jr., Washington’s secretary and aide de camp, noted that Washington “expressed his 
Surprize.”266  If Washington had known about the embarkations, perhaps he reacted to Carleton’s 
appearance of apathy that he had violated Article VII of the peace treaty.  Unbeknownst to 
Carleton, some of Washington’s own slaves had escaped to British lines.267 
Carleton’s response to Washington was composed, confident, and decided.  First, he said 
that the black men and women were no longer property, but already free under British sanction at 
the time the provisional peace terms were written, as discussed earlier in this chapter.  Second, 
he insisted “it could not have been the intention of the British Government by the Treaty of 
Peace to reduce themselves to the necessity of violating their Faith to the Negroes.”268  To 
Carleton, it was illogical that the British negotiators, the King, and Parliament would approve a 
clause that negated the work of Howe, Clinton, and other British officials.  Although Carleton 
did not know that the British negotiators did not protest the addition of Article VII, he defended 
his counterparts as honorable servants of the empire.  He added that conceding to the Americans’ 
desires of restoring slaves to their former masters would be a “dishonourable Violation of the 
public Faith” and disgrace to “National Honor, which must be kept with all Colours.”269  
Washington argued that this conduct was against the “Letter and Spirit of the Articles of 
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Peace.”270  Carleton’s composed defense suggests that he predicted the Americans would see his 
actions as a violation of the peace treaty.  He was prepared to defend his actions as upholding of 
the honor and reputation of the British Empire.  
 Carleton made it clear to Washington that the ex-slaves would not be returned to their 
former masters.  He told the American general that the Crown instead would compensate the 
slave owners for their losses.  Carleton saw this as ideal because “Justice was done to all Parties: 
the slave and his owner.”271  He reassured Washington that he had already taken measures to see 
this through by creating a register that identified each ex-slaves’ name, age, and occupation, as 
well as their former master’s name and residence.272   Historian Henry Wiencek points out that 
Carleton, however, did not understand the economic underpinnings of plantation slavery in the 
thirteen colonies—enslaved people were not worth just the value of their persons, but were worth 
their labor and the offspring they could bear.273   
The register Carleton spoke of was called the Book of Negroes.274  It accounted for 3,000 
black men, women, and children who left from Manhattan under British sanction.  Written next 
to some of the names of the listed refugees is “GBC,” signifying that the individual possessed a 
Birch Certificate authorizing their freedom.275  The meeting with Carleton made it clear to 
Washington that the American slave owners would not see the return of their runaway slaves.276  
Carleton’s creation of the register was a clever ruse to appease Washington, ensure promised 
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liberty, and uphold imperial honor: it supposedly implied later payment to the American slave 
owners; yet, simultaneously permitted the black refugees to slip out of their grasp.  
Carleton’s reasoning suggests that he could not abide his country breaking its word to a 
group of loyal subjects.  Fundamental disagreements regarding the status and rights of subjects 
living within the empire had been the centerpiece of the rebellion in the North American 
colonies.  In contrast to the rebels’ points of view, British officials and loyalists defended the 
empire as beneficial to all subjects for protection and assurance of liberty.  Carleton likely 
wanted to highlight the empire’s willingness to provide fair treatment and liberty to its subjects, 
especially after thirteen colonies had just broken away on the grounds of lack of representation 
as subjects within an imperial system.  
 As someone who had spent most of their life in the military, international codes of war, 
often called laws of nations in the eighteenth century, likely influenced Carleton’s perspectives 
on the loyalist population in question, as well.  Codes, or laws, of war were the expectations of 
behavior that officers and soldiers were supposed to observe during wartime.  By the eighteenth 
century, European armies widely recognized and observed, however imperfectly, these 
expectations aimed to lessen the chaos of war and provide protection for both soldiers and 
civilians.277  These codes, for instance, laid out the expectations of wartime conventions, such as 
plunder and surrender, and established how to handle noncombatants and their property.278  As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, Samuel Bever wrote about the importance of officers knowing and 
following the laws of nations.279  The works of jurists like Hugo Grotius’s The Rights of War and 
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Peace and Emer de Vattel’s The Laws of Nations taught officers how to follow proper wartime 
customs and conduct.280  
These laws were important to Carleton’s situation in the 1780s because they set standards 
for dealing with property of the enemy—in this case, black runaways who were legally 
considered private property to American slave owners.  It is worth noting that General 
Washington had been at pains to use military discipline as a means to show that the United 
States, in fact, was a sovereign state to which the laws of war applied.281  In The Laws of War 
and Peace, for instance, Grotius wrote that a state at war had the right to seize property of the 
enemy state in order to weaken the enemy state and use the property for its own benefit.282  
Carleton’s actions aligned with this stance.  Emer de Vattel, however, a contemporary with 
Carleton, argued that private property was not fungible in war.  Yet, since Carleton did not see 
the black men and women as private property when he found them in New York, he did not 
believe he was withholding American private property. 
Not as private property, but as another group of His Majesty’s loyal subjects is how 
Carleton viewed the black runaways.  Like the French Canadians in Quebec, they existed within 
the realm of the British Empire and were theoretically guaranteed the King’s protection.  As the 
French Canadians’ adherence to Catholicism did not exclude them from subjecthood, the race of 
the black refugees in New York did not either.  Carleton was aware that in any empire, it was the 
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that gave it strength.  To Carleton, the dignity of an empire came from upholding honor and 
promises to its subjects.  He paternalistically saw this population under the complete care and 
dependence of British aid, and he knew if the British did not help the black refugees, they would 
be left to the ruthlessness of the slave owners and the apathy of the American Congress. 
Carleton’s actions were met with the utmost praise from British officials and fury from 
the Americans.  Both King George III and Lord North openly approved Carleton’s upholding of 
honor to the black subjects.  Lord North’s words likely summed up what most British officials 
and informed subjects felt about Carleton’s decision: it was “an Act of Justice due to them from 
us.”283  Upon returning to his chambers after meeting with Carleton, Washington wrote 
hopelessly to both Governor Harrison and Lund Washington, one of his cousins, that the slaves 
would never be restored to their masters.284  Washington’s despondency contrasted the American 
Congress’s fury.  James Madison, for instance, charged Carleton with “a palpable & scandalous 
misconstruction of the Treaty.”285  The American delegation in Paris also protested, writing to 
British officials in London that evacuating the black runaways “has irritated the citizens of 
America to an alarming degree.”286  In protecting this contested population of British subjects, 
Carleton’s actions aligned with theoretical ideals of an expansive and dependable British 
subjecthood.  Additionally, British and Americans’ contrasting responses to Carleton’s actions 
highlight the two country’s increasingly different stances on slavery at the end of the war.  
As a military officer and imperial public official for his entire adult life, he had been 
obligated to follow a strict set of duties and moral codes.  It was not within his mental framework 																																																								
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to break obligations to the Crown and its subjects.  It is true that Carleton wanted to maintain 
national honor, as many historians have argued, but it is important to highlight that his 
upbringing and lifelong influence of the imperial system led him to uphold both lofty ideas of 
honor and on-the-ground promises.287  He had a duty to follow orders from his superiors in 
London, as well as a just as important duty to British subjects.  
 
Conclusion  
Throughout the conflict in the thirteen colonies, Carleton had hoped for reconciliation in order to 
maintain the integrity of the newly expanded British Empire.  He returned to North America 
under the perception of negotiating peace and compromise, but the Rockingham ministry had 
sent him in order to clean up the mess of an unsuccessful war.  Although the news of American 
independence left Carleton bewildered and disappointed, he maintained his post in New York 
City as Commander-in-Chief.  He could not prevent independence, so he used his position of 
authority to do the next best thing: maintain the continuity of the empire through protecting the 
Crown’s loyal subjects.  Despite Article VII of the Treaty of Paris, it was not an option to desert 
a group of loyal subjects in a hostile land.  Carleton felt more obligated to support his fellow 
subjects than to follow an international treaty.  It is clear that Carleton not only wanted to uphold 
British honor and promises, but that his ultimate reasoning stemmed from his lifetime of 
experience serving the empire and protecting its diverse range of subjects. 
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Conclusion 
 
Although the loss of the thirteen British North American colonies dismayed Carleton, he 
likely felt assured that he had upheld his notions of empire and subjecthood.  In overseeing the 
evacuation of loyalists to safe parts of the empire, he helped advance the British imperial system 
elsewhere.  To Carleton, it was not one’s race, national origin, or religion that mattered the most, 
but it was one’s loyalty to the sovereign of Britain.  His prioritization of loyalty came from his 
background as an army officer and long-time colonial official, and British imperial mechanisms 
defined his mental framework, shaping his ultimate mission for the continuity of a British 
Empire.  After the Americans heard of Carleton’s stance on evacuating escaped enslaved 
peoples, Thomas Jones, a loyalist and the New York judge, suggested an explanation for the 
Commander’s actions: “He possessed the honor of a soldier, the religion of a Christian, and the 
virtues of humanity.  He loved his country, he loved his King, and was determined to see neither 
disgraced.  He shuddered at the article that gave up the blacks, and at once resolved to apply a 
substitute.”288  Jones did, in fact, understand Carleton, whose decisions at the end of the war 
were predicated on a lifetime of service in an in increasingly professionalized military and an 
increasingly diverse empire.  Carleton followed British laws and acted upon a theoretically 
expansive conception of subjecthood more so than most British officials.  Ultimately, Carleton 
strove for the continuity of the British imperial system that had influenced his entire life.  
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Departing New York City: Carleton and Refugees  
 On November 25, 1783, British officials were ready to embark the last vessels leaving 
New York City.  That afternoon, Carleton led a contingent of British soldiers down the Bowery 
and to the wharf to board the Ceres.289  When Carleton departed from New York three days later, 
his black servant, Pomp, likely accompanied him across the Atlantic.  Although Pomp probably 
had a freedom certificate, Carleton wished that he remain in his service.290  It is unclear what 
happened to Pomp when the Ceres arrived in England, although he could have remained a 
servant to Carleton like he had requested.  Either Carleton’s slave or Carleton’s hired servant, 
Pomp was still a subject to His Majesty, and either status he held he was below Carleton in the 
British Empire’s hierarchy of subjecthood.   
  Before Carleton and Pomp left New York, dozens of British vessels holding refugee 
black men, women, and children had already departed the city to other parts of the empire.  
Before departing, however, a group of British and American inspectors checked over each 
individual on the docks one final time to make sure that all names matched the passenger list and 
that every individual was recorded in the Book of Negroes.  The fleeing people must have been 
especially worried about the presence of American inspectors; yet, in theory, the British 
inspectors, too, could remove anyone from the docks and ships.  Last-minute removals turned 
out to be rare, but until onboard the ship and sailing out of the harbor, anxieties must have run 
rampant fearing the worst: fear that they would not, in fact, get to leave.291   
Over three hundred black loyalists departed New York harbor on the L’Abondance, for 
instance, bound for Port Roseway, Nova Scotia.  For three days at the end of July 1783, black 
loyalists from all walks of life boarded that ship.  A Jane Thompson had come from Norfolk, 																																																								
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Virginia, with her eleven-year-old grandchild.  The Book of Negroes described her as “worn 
out.”292   Margaret Wallis came with her two-week-old daughter, Judith, who was likely born in 
a camp in the city.  Juno Thomas, a middle-aged man, came from Savannah.  Boston King, and 
his wife Violet, embarked the L’Abondance, as well as Harry Washington, one of General 
George Washington’s slaves who had escaped Mount Vernon.293  Also on the vessel was Moses 
Wilkinson, a Methodist preacher who would attract a large congregation in Nova Scotia.  The 
L’Abondance carried more black men, women, and children loyalists to Nova Scotia than any 
other British vessel.294  Much more important than Carleton’s legacy of fairness to all subjects 
were the people aboard this ship, along with the other vessels, who had seized the opportunity to 
live outside the bounds of slavery, and to pass that freedom to their children. 
 
Beyond the Thirteen Colonies 
With the aid of British ships, captains, crews, and provisions, free black men and women 
spread throughout the world to live in other British territories.  Their courses were not easy, and 
some of them moved from their first colony of refuge to others.  Many of the hundreds who went 
to Nova Scotia settled in Birchtown, named after the magistrate who signed their certificates of 
freedom.  One group of black loyalists first went to East Florida, and then to Country Harbor, 
Nova Scotia, and soon thereafter moved to Halifax, Nova Scotia.295  Black men and women also 
went to London and other parts of England.  There was already a sizeable black population in the 
imperial metropolis, and historian Gretchen Gerzina notes that it was much less restrictive for 																																																								
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people of African and African American origin than America.296  Although England was equated 
with freedom, in part due to the 1772 Somerset Case, the black population from America came to 
be known as the “Black Poor” of London.297  Because the communities in Nova Scotia faced 
hardships to survive and black men and women in England did not live in much better 
conditions, many chose to relocate again.  In London, a group of philanthropists organized and 
developed a resettlement effort on the west coast of Africa.  The some 350 blacks that originally 
moved to the new colony of Sierra Leone were guaranteed land grants along with the tools and 
provisions in order to begin anew.298 
As a result of piecing together the stories of black women and men who fled out of New 
York City, historians in the last decade have made Carleton’s legacy clear.299  Today, historians 
know Carleton for his actions in 1782 and 1783 because they directly affected thousands of 
people.  It is important to remember, however, that Carleton was not the only British official that 
helped facilitate further diaspora in this period, and although he was not an abolitionist, by the 
late 1780s there was an active abolitionist movement in Britain to end the transatlantic slave 
trade.300  Carleton was an important factor in the lives of over 3,000 black men, women, and 
children, however, it was the black women and men who made choices, showed determination 
and undying strength, and underwent hardships in order to pursue their freedom as subjects of 
the British Empire.  																																																												
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